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1 - 10 of 14 (0.34 seconds)V.D. M. R. M. M. R. M. Muthiah Chettiar vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras on 14 February, 1969
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"....The relevant clause under S. 33A(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act has also been similarly construed by the
Madras High Court in Muthia Chettiar v. Commissioner
of Income-tax, Madras, ILR 1951 Mad 815: (AIR 1951
Mad 204). "If a person is given a right to resort to a
remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a
prescribed time", observed Rajamannar, C.J., "limitation
should not be computed from a date earlier than that on
which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or
had an opportunity of knowing the order, and therefore
must be presumed to have the knowledge of the order".
In other words the Madras High Court has taken the
view that the omission to use the words "from the date
of communication" in S. 33A(2) does not mean that
limitation can start to run against a party even before
the party either knew or should have known about the
said order. In our opinion this conclusion is obviously
right."
Manawat Palstics Pvt. Ltd. Through Its ... vs The Customs, Excise And Service Tax ... on 5 January, 2016
There is absolutely no dispute with the well settled
proposition of law as laid down in the judgments rendered in the
cases of Bengal Chemists & Druggists Assn., M/s Patel Brothers
and M/s Falcon types Ltd. (supra). However, in the present case,
we are concerned with the date from which the period of six
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months have to be counted.
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer And ... on 30 March, 1961
The case in hand is even better. Rule 63(4) of the Rules of
2017 already provides three months from the date of
communication with the proviso that the same can be extended
but not beyond six months from the date of the order appealed.
Thus, the date of the order cannot be determined from the date
when it was passed. It must also consider as to when the same
came to be known to the parties concerned. The mechanical
construction of the words "the date of the order" would not be
appropriate in the circumstances. Once the Rule provides the
limitation as three months from the date of the communication,
the further extension upto six months in the proviso cannot be
restricted from the date of the order as the same is granted for
extension of time and not for reducing the same. Hence, six
months limitation period has to be construed from the date of the
communication of such an order as also determined by the Apex
Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra).
Kavanna Vana Ena Swaminathan Alias ... vs Letchmanan Chettiar And Ors. on 26 November, 1929
1 89. so the question arose as to when the time
would begin to run. The High Court held that the time can
begin to run only from the date on which the decision is
communicated to the parties. "If there was any decision
at all in the sense of the Act", says the judgment, "it
could not date earlier than the date of the communication
of it to the parties; otherwise they might, be barred of
their right, of appeal without any knowledge of the
decision having been passed". Adopting the same
principle a, similar construction has been placed by the
Madras High Court in K. V. E. Swaminathan alias
Chidambaram Pillai v. Letchmanan Chettiar, ILR 53 Mad
491: (AIR 1930 Mad 490) On the limitation provisions
contained in Ss. 73(1) and 77(l) of the Indian
Registration Act XVI of 1908. It was held that in a case
where an order was not passed in the presence of the
parties or after notice to them of the date when the order
would be passed the expression "within thirty days after
the making of the order" used in the said sections means
within thirty days after the date on which the
communication of the order reached the parties affected
by it. These decisions show that where the rights of a
person are affected by any order and limitation is
prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the
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person aggrieved against the said order by reference to
the making of the said order, the making of the order
must mean either actual or constructive communication
of the said order to the party concerned. Therefore, we
are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in error
in coming to the conclusion that the application made by
the appellant in the present proceedings was barred
under the proviso to S.18 of the Act."