Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 9 of 9 (0.18 seconds)Section 30 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Section 34 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Power Control Appliances vs Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd on 8 February, 1994
9. Then we turn to the question of delay and acquiescence. Mr. Tulzapurkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent cites the judgment of the Supreme Court in Power Control Appliances and Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., wherein the Supreme Court approvingly referred to the judgment of the Appeal Court in England in Electrolux LD v. Electrix and quoted a passage therefrom in paragraph 34 of its judgment. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment in Electrolux itself. Reference to the judgment in Electrolux shows that there is no hard and fast rule that delay per se would defeat an application for interlocutory injunction. The judgment indicates that in a situation where the defendant to an action has been using the mark, even if concurrently, without making himself aware of the fact as to whether the same mark is the subject-matter of the registration and belongs to another person, the first person cannot be heard to complain for he has been using it negligently inasmuch as he has not taken the elementary precaution of making himself aware by looking at the public record of Registrar as to whether the mark in question is the property of another. If, however, he had taken search and, knowing full well that the mark was the property of another person, continues to use the mark, then he runs the risk of a registered proprietor challenging his action for infringement and merely because it is done at a subsequent stage, he cannot be heard to complain on the ground of delay. Further discussion in the judgment shows that in order to deny an interlocutory injunction, the delay must be such as to have induced the defendant or at least to have lulled him into a false sense of security to continue to use the trade mark in the belief that he was the monarch of all he surveyed. In our judgment, such are not the circumstances here. We are not satisfied from the record that a search was taken of the registry by the Appellant to assure itself that there was no other person who owned the mark "MICRODINE". Assuming that the search was taken, and the Appellant has done it consciously, then the Appellant has to thank itself for having gambled by investing large amounts in a risky venture. Either way, we do not think that the defence can succeed, at this stage, at least.
The Trade Marks Act, 1999
D. Adinarayana Setty vs Brooke Bond Tea Of India Ltd. on 14 August, 1959
10. Then we come to the question of whether the suit should be stayed. A judgment of the Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in D. Adinarayana Setty, v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd., AIR 1960 MYSORE 142 was brought to our attention. We notice that this was a case where the Defendant had, even before filing of the suit, presented an application under the provisions of law corresponding to Section 12(3) of the present Act. In our case, such being not the situation, we are afraid that the judgment does not help us. It is unnecessary for us to pronounce on the principle enunciated in this judgment as to the stay of the suit, which we shall reserve for a future occasion.
Section 28 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Section 29 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
1