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Puran, Shekhar And Anr vs Rambilas & Anr., State Of Maharashtra & ... on 3 May, 2001 cites

R.Rathinam vs State By Dsp, District Crime Branch on 8 February, 2000

In this behalf the ratio laid down in the case of R. Rathinam vs. State by DSP, District Crime Branch, Madurai District, Madurai and anr. reported in 2000 (2) S.C.C. 391, needs to be seen. In this case Bail had been granted to certain persons. A group of practising advocates presented petitions before Chief Justice of the High Court seeking initiation of suo motu proceedings for cancellation of bail. The Chief Justice placed the petitions before a Division Bench. The Division Bench refused to exercise the suo motu powers on the ground that the petition submitted by the advocates was not maintainable. This Court held that the frame of sub-section (2) of Section 439 indicates that it is a power conferred on the Courts mentioned therein. It was held that there was nothing to indicate that the said power can be exercised only if the State or investigating agency or a Public Prosecutor moves by a petition. It was held that the power so vested in the High Court can be invoked either by the State or by any aggrieved party. It was held that the said power could also be exercised suo motu by the High Court.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 80 - Full Document

Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Menon & Ors. Etc vs State Of Gujarat on 14 March, 1988

It was held that, therefore, any member of the public, whether he belongs to any particular profession or otherwise could move the High Court to remind it of the need to exercise its power suo motu. It was held that there was no barrier either in Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code or in any other law which inhibits a person from moving the High Court to have such powers exercised suo motu. It was held that if the High Court considered that there was no need to cancel the bail then it could dismiss the Petition. It was held that it was always open to the High Court to cancel the bail if it felt that there were sufficient enough reasons for doing so. Mr. Lalit next relied upon the authorities in the cases of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1988(2) S.C.C. 271, Amar Nath and others vs. State of Haryana and others reported in AIR 1977 S.C. 2185 and M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another reported in AIR 1978 S.C. 45. Relying on these he submitted that an order granting bail was an interlocutory order, and the High Court could not exercise powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and thus could not cancel Bail. Mr. Lalit submitted that Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the power of cancellation of bail both to the Sessions Court and the High Court. He submitted that thus the High Court and Sessions Court were co-ordinate Courts under this Section. He submitted that the High Court could not thus sit in Appeal or Revision over an Order of the Court of Sessions. He submitted that under Section 439(2), it is only the orders of the Magistrate, which could be set aside by the High Court or the Court of Sessions.
Supreme Court of India Cites 40 - Cited by 117 - A P Sen - Full Document

India Pipe Fitting Co vs Fakruddin M.A. Baker And Anr on 4 November, 1977

It was held that, therefore, any member of the public, whether he belongs to any particular profession or otherwise could move the High Court to remind it of the need to exercise its power suo motu. It was held that there was no barrier either in Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code or in any other law which inhibits a person from moving the High Court to have such powers exercised suo motu. It was held that if the High Court considered that there was no need to cancel the bail then it could dismiss the Petition. It was held that it was always open to the High Court to cancel the bail if it felt that there were sufficient enough reasons for doing so. Mr. Lalit next relied upon the authorities in the cases of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1988(2) S.C.C. 271, Amar Nath and others vs. State of Haryana and others reported in AIR 1977 S.C. 2185 and M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another reported in AIR 1978 S.C. 45. Relying on these he submitted that an order granting bail was an interlocutory order, and the High Court could not exercise powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and thus could not cancel Bail. Mr. Lalit submitted that Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the power of cancellation of bail both to the Sessions Court and the High Court. He submitted that thus the High Court and Sessions Court were co-ordinate Courts under this Section. He submitted that the High Court could not thus sit in Appeal or Revision over an Order of the Court of Sessions. He submitted that under Section 439(2), it is only the orders of the Magistrate, which could be set aside by the High Court or the Court of Sessions.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 93 - P K Goswami - Full Document

Madhu Limaye vs The State Of Maharashtra on 31 October, 1977

We see no substance in this submission. In the hierarchy of Courts, the High Court is the Superior Court. A restrictive interpretation which would have effect of nullifying Section 439(2) cannot be given. When Section 439(2) grants to the High Court the power to cancel bail, it necessarily follows that such powers can be exercised also in respect of Orders passed by the Court of Sessions. Of course cancellation of bail has to be on principles set out hereinabove and only in appropriate cases. Further, even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified. [Re. Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharasthra (1977) 4 SCC 551 and Krishnan and Another v. Krishnaveni and Another (1997) 4 SCC 241].
Supreme Court of India Cites 27 - Cited by 1313 - N L Untwalia - Full Document

Krishnan & Anr vs Krishnaveni & Anr on 24 January, 1997

We see no substance in this submission. In the hierarchy of Courts, the High Court is the Superior Court. A restrictive interpretation which would have effect of nullifying Section 439(2) cannot be given. When Section 439(2) grants to the High Court the power to cancel bail, it necessarily follows that such powers can be exercised also in respect of Orders passed by the Court of Sessions. Of course cancellation of bail has to be on principles set out hereinabove and only in appropriate cases. Further, even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified. [Re. Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharasthra (1977) 4 SCC 551 and Krishnan and Another v. Krishnaveni and Another (1997) 4 SCC 241].
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 356 - K Ramaswamy - Full Document
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