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Ghanshiam Singh vs Smt. Har Piarey And Anr. on 6 March, 1974 cites

Kedar Nath Goenka vs Munshi Ram Narain Lal on 4 June, 1935

In this connection reference may be made to Munni Bibi v. Triloki Nath, AIR 1931 PC 114; Kishun Prasad v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1931 PC 231; Maung Sein Done v. Ma Pan Nyun, AIR 1932 PC 161; Kedar Nath v. Munshi Ram, AIR 1935 PC 139; Pooran Chand v. Radha Raman, AIR 1943 All 197 and Chandu Lal v. Khaliluur Rahman, AIR 1950 PC 17; S. P. Misra v. Babuaji, AIR 1970 SC 809 (para 4); Dhan Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, AIR 1973 SC 283 (Para 7). The law which applies to a case of co-defendants applies equally to a case of co-plaintiffs.
Bombay High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 23 - Full Document

Chandu Lal Agarwalla vs Khalilur Rahaman on 14 November, 1949

19. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 then referred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Shanker Lal's case AIR 1934 AH 730 (supra). In that case one Smt. Ram Devi was the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder in execution of his decree against Smt. Ram Devi had sought to execute the decree by sale of her assets and had impleaded certain persons as the legal representatives of Smt. Ram Devi The decree-holder was not concerned with the question who was the real heir to the estate of the deceased because all that he was interested in was the realisation of the amount due to him out of the assets of the deceased judgment-debtor. Out of the persons impleaded as legal representatives of Smt. Ram Devi aforesaid, one Shyam Sunder on the one hand and certain other relations of Smt. Ram Devi on her father's side on the other claimed to be heirs of Smt. Ram Devi. The execution Court recorded a finding in favour of Shyam Sunder. Against that order an appeal was filed and the question arose as to whether the appeal was maintainable. It was held that under Order XXII, Rule 12, Civil P. C. it was not absolutely necessary for the execution Court to apply the provisions of Rules 3, 4 and 8 of that order, to an execution proceeding but it was necessary in order to avoid all future trouble to have all possible claimants before the Court in case they wanted to urge any objection. It was pointed out that the execution Court thinking that it was its duty to proceed under Order XXII, Rule 5 and determine the question who was the heir of the deceased, recorded a finding in favour of Shyam Sunder. The learned Judges took the view that the dispute decided was one between two sets of persons who were claiming to be the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor and was not at all a dispute between the decree-holder on the one side and the judgment-debtor on the other. An analogy was drawn from the decision made in proceedings under Order XXII, Rule 5, Civil P. C. and on the view that since a decision under Order XXII, Rule 5 was not appealable, an order in an execution proceeding deciding who should be treated for the purposes of the execution as a representative of the deceased, was also not appealable inasmuch as it was a summary order,
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 23 - Full Document

Dhan Singh vs Jt. Director Of Consolidation, U.P., ... on 20 December, 1972

In this connection reference may be made to Munni Bibi v. Triloki Nath, AIR 1931 PC 114; Kishun Prasad v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1931 PC 231; Maung Sein Done v. Ma Pan Nyun, AIR 1932 PC 161; Kedar Nath v. Munshi Ram, AIR 1935 PC 139; Pooran Chand v. Radha Raman, AIR 1943 All 197 and Chandu Lal v. Khaliluur Rahman, AIR 1950 PC 17; S. P. Misra v. Babuaji, AIR 1970 SC 809 (para 4); Dhan Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, AIR 1973 SC 283 (Para 7). The law which applies to a case of co-defendants applies equally to a case of co-plaintiffs.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 9 - N D Ojha - Full Document

Maruti Ramrao Chandavarkar vs Mallapur Shri Gopal Krishna on 17 November, 1931

In Rama Maruti v. Mallappa Krishna, ATR 1942 Bom 309 it was held that where an order was passed by the execution Court under Section 47(3) after hearing both sides as to whether a person was representative of a party the principle of res judicata applies even though the subject-matter of the two proceedings may be different provided the issue is the same. In this connection it was urged for opposite party No. 1 that in view of the phrase "for the purposes of this Section" occurring in Section 47(3) the decision given by the execution Court in the said sub-section was only for the purposes of Section 47 and could not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. I am, however, unable to agree with this submission. To me it appears that the phrase aforesaid was really used in order to bring a decision under Sub-section (3) squarely within the definition of decree as contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 2. As already pointed out above the definition of decree includes "the determination of any question within Section 47." It was with a view to exclude all speculations on the point as to whether a question which arose and was decided as contemplated by Section 47(3) was or was not within Section 47 that the phrase "for the purposes of this section" was used. In order to ascertain the purpose of Section 47 one has to turn to Sub-section (1) thereof. The said sub-section is to the effect that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. This sub-section left to itself does not provide for any procedure to determine as to whether a person is or is not the representative of a party. Even if Sub-section (3) had not been there, the question as to who was a representative of a party would have been necessary to be decided before the execution could proceed. How this question was to be decided, namely, by a separate suit or in a collateral proceeding, would have been a matter of controversy. It was to exclude the possibility of such a controversy that Sub-section (3) was enacted. If a decision is given under Section 47(3) "for the purposes of this section" the question on which such a decision is given would at once be one within Section 47. As already pointed out above unless the decree-holder or his representative is party to the execution proceedings the decree cannot be executed for there will be no one who could give a valid discharge to the decree. Consequently whether or not a person is the representative of a party necessarily becomes a question "relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree" within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 47. If such a question has been heard and finally decided it will be a decree within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 and would consequently operate as constructive res judicata in a subsequent suit where the same question is raised.
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Raj Lakshmi Dasi And Others vs Banamali Sen And Othersbholanath Sen ... on 27 October, 1952

14. Likewise the fact that the shop which was the subject matter of dispute in the execution proceedings was different than the ane which is in dispute in the suit giving rise to the present revision, would also not present any difficulty. The test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved. See Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banmali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33; Ram Govind v. Bhakta Bala, AIR 1971 SC 664 and.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 122 - M C Mahajan - Full Document

Thondam Annamalai Mudali vs Tiruttani Ramasami Mudali And Ors. on 25 October, 1940

In support he placed reliance on Annamalai Mudali v. Ramasami Mudali, AIR 1941 Mad 161 (FB); Bapanna v. Jaggiah, AIR 1943 Mad 407 and Sankaralingam v. Ramaswami, AIR 1945 Mad 25. None of these cases, however, were such where any order had been passed by the execution Court under Section 47(3), Civil P. C. and the point as to whether an order passed under Section 47(3) resulted in the "determination of a question within Section 47" or that such an order was one "relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree" neither came up for consideration nor was decided in any of the cases referred to above. These cases, therefore, afford no assistance in determination of the question involved in the instant case.
Madras High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 17 - Full Document
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