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1 - 10 of 13 (0.63 seconds)Article 120 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 126 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Murajalli Munia Goundan vs Ramasami Chetti And Ors. on 12 February, 1918
In Hunia Goundan v. Ramasami Chetty, AIR 1918 Mad 19, Sadasiva Ayyar, J., interpreting Article 126 said-
Section 28 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Nagendra Nath Dey vs Suresh Chandra Dey on 21 April, 1932
When faced with this situation, the learned Complainant for the respondents submitted that it would be wholly inequitable to apply Article 120 of the Limitation Act. According to the learned counsel, if the coparceners are divested of the possession of the property, then they can get joint possession within 12 years under Article 126 of the Limitation Act and it could never be the intention of law to restrict the period of limitation in case the joint property continues to remain in their possession. This submission loses sight of the fact that the Articles of the Limitation Act are somewhat arbitrary in nature. They have to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of literal interpretation as laid down in Nagendra Nath Dey's case, AIR 1932 PC 165(supra).
Masit-Ullah vs Lala Damodar Prasad on 22 June, 1926
"In Masit Ullah v. Damodar Prasad AIR 1926 PC 105, where the plaintiff sought to set aside as sale of joint family property by his great grandfather and his father was impleaded as a defendant and did not give evidence, though as the man who had used the largest part of the consideration money for the disbursement of ancestral debts he could have told in his evidence how the sum of Rs. 2,000/- was applied, it was held, as stated in the headnote, that the suit should be dismissed, as the plaintiff was liable for his great grandfather's ancestral debts, and the father, who was in collusion with his son, had deliberately withheld his evidence, which would have shown how the rest of the consideration was applied. The present case is even stronger. Ram Partap and Bhairon Nath, defendants 4 and 5, are the eldest members of the family and heads of their respective branches, which are entitled to nearly one-half of the joint family properties. They were Mathura's right-hand men and borrowed practically all the money which has been disallowed by the High Court, and are therefore in a better position than anyone else to say whether it was applied for the necessary purposes of the family. They have allowed their children, who are all minors but one, to figure as plaintiffs and have themselves been impleaded as defendants 4 and 5. They have not gone into the box in support of the plaintiff's case in which they are so largely interested. * * *." In these circumstances their Lordships have no hesitation in holding that this also was a collusive of suit, and that the conduct of defendants 4 and 5 affords ample corroboration "of the other evidence that the this sale was effected for necessary family purposes."
Sukhnandan Singh Etc vs Jamiat Singh & Ors on 18 February, 1971
The entire family is being benefited by the business. In this situation, it is legitimate to infer that the family, including the respondents, after having received the benefit of this loan, has set up the minor members to challenge the same. In view of these circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the suit brought by the plaintiffs was a collusive one. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied on Sukhnandan Singh v. Jamiat Singh, 1971 Pun LJ 278 = (AIR 1971 SC 1158) in which it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court As follows:--
Faqir Chand vs Harnam Kaur & Anr on 5 August, 1966
In Faqir Chand v. Sardarni Harnam Kaur, AIR 1967 SC 727, the Court expressly over-ruled the decision given in AIR 1961 Punj 138(FB) with the following observations:--