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1 - 10 of 11 (0.24 seconds)Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd. & Others vs The Collector Of Central Excise & Ors on 25 April, 1985
Again on Section 4 unamended the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Bata Shoe Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1985 (21) E.L.T. 9 is also relevant wherein the Supreme Court held that before the question of availability of exemption under a notification of goods leviable to duty ad valorem, the first essential step is to determine the value of the article in the manner prescribed in Section 4 of the Act. The Court observed that the fact that on such a computation, the article may ultimately be found to be exempted from excise duty (as was the result in that case) does not have any bearing on the question of applicability of Section 4 of the Act for determining its 'value' for the purposes of duty. The expression 'for the purposes of duty' occurring in Section 4, the court held, has a wide import.
Itc Ltd. And Anr. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 22 August, 1990
Para-10 " The ratio of the above decision was clear. On their interpretation, Section 4 of the Act and the notification had to be given effect to separately, one after the other. First, under Section 4, the excise duty payable or leviable had first to be determined with reference to the rates of duty prescribed in the Schedule. This process necessarily involved a determination of the assessable value as a first step in the determination of duty. After this, as a second step, the notification of exemption was to be applied which directed that a part of the excise duty so computed as payable or leviable should be exempted. The ultimate effect of this, no doubt, was that the "effective duty" payable becomes less and if the assessable value were to be recomputed on the basis of such effective duty, it will be larger than the assessable value taken at the first state of computation. But there was nothing in the statute or notification which spelt out or justified a repetition of this process of determination of the assessable value (which had already been gone through) after the notification has been given effect to. There was no justification to read Section 4 and the notification as dovetailing into each other, to consider the effective duty payable as the excise duty 'payable' within the meaning of Section 4(4)(d) and to determine the assessable value and the excise duty payable as if a reduced rate of duty for these goods had been enacted in the First Schedule itself".
Himachal Steel Kandrori vs Collector Of Central Excise on 21 June, 1988
The Collector (Appeals) has then proceeded to give his method of calculation. But it should be noted that what was before the Collector (Appeals) the impugned order was a de novo adjudication by Assistant Collector in terms of the earlier order of the Appellate Collector dated 25-10-1976 and the perusal of the Appellate Collector's remand order would clearly show as already noted above that method of calculation of exemption under Notification No. 108/74 was concluded in that order and was not an issue remanded to Assistant Collector for redetermination. In such a context, when admittedly there was no review application against the earlier orders of Collector (Appeals) it will not be correct for another Collector (Appeals) to pronounce the method approved earlier by Appellate Collector as incorrect, and proceed to lay down his own formula. The appellants have rightly cited and relied upon the Tribunal decision in the case of Himachal Steel Kandrori v. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh, reported in 1988 (37) E.L.T. 291 (Tribunal) wherein the Tribunal held in Para-6 as follows :-
Collector Of Central Excise,Guntur vs Andhra Sugar Ltd on 26 October, 1988
This very notification came up for interpretation before the Government of India in its order in review No. 248 of 1979 in respect of an order passed by Appellate Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi in the case of Shriram Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. It was held that the Assistant Collector was bound first to work out the duty as would be leviable i.e. ex-factory wholesale price as if the amount of FPEC was not paid and, thereafter on being satisfied that it has been so deposited by the manufacturer as per the stipulated undertaking, the Assistant Collector was then to deduct the duty on the FPEC (on Rs. 610 @ 15% = Rs. 91.50) from the duty worked out earlier. It is now well settled that such interpretation by the Government of India has to be given due weight as it is in the nature of contemporaneous exposition. See Supreme Court decision in the case of C.C.E. Guntur v. Andhra Sugar Ltd. - 1989 (19) E.C.C. 46.
The Gujarat Finance Act, 1932
The Central Excise Act, 1944
Union Of India (Uoi), Owning Southern ... vs Tiruchi Metal Works Represented By Its ... on 9 December, 1988
The recent Supreme Court decision in MRF case (supra) is more on deduction in assessable value of duty under Section 4(4)(d)(ii) whereas here it is on the working out the assessable value to give effect to exemption Notification 108/74. It is, therefore, found, on a consideration of the scope of Section 4 of Central Excises and Salt Act as it existed at the relevant time, and the judicial interpretation thereof, as well as Government of India's own understanding of the provisions of that Section with reference to the very same Notification No. 108/74, that the method adopted by the Appellate Collector in his earlier order dated 25-10-1976 is in order and needs no modification. Even otherwise, the present impugned order of Collector (Appeals), we have found is not sustainable on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
Kerala State Detergents And Chemicals ... vs Collector Of Central Excise on 4 November, 1986
6. I have considered the arguments and the case law cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is admitted to the respondent that the earlier adjudication order, dated 23-8-1979 holding a part of the refund claim as time-barred was set aside by the Collector (Appeals) vide his Order dated 18-11-1982 expressly holding that "the claim has to be treated in time". It is further admitted to the respondent that no appeal was filed against that Order of the Collector (Appeals) which held the claim as within time, by the department. Thus in my opinion the said Order of the Collector (Appeals) dated 18-11-1982 holding the refund claim within time whether right or wrong became final and cannot be raised again in readjudication as held by this Tribunal in the case of Kerala State Detergents and Chemicals Ltd. v. Collector, supra. The observations of the Assistant Collector in his readjudication Order dated 7-1-1985 that the said Order dated 18-11-1982 passed by the Collector (Appeals) in fact directed him to examine the claim and pass necessary order is partly correct. But it is settled law that Order of the Appellate Authority is to be read as a whole and not in part. From a perusal of the said Order dated 18-11-1982 of the Collector (Appeals) it would appear that the only issue before him was as to whether the Assistant Collector was right in rejecting the part of the claim of the appellants as time-barred and the learned Collector after examining the facts and the case law cited by the appellants expressly recorded a finding that the claim has to be treated in time. And after holding so directed the Assistant Collector to examine the claim on merits and passed necessary orders but it is unfortunate that the Assistant Collector overlooked the said expressed findings recorded by the Collector (Appeals) in his Order dated 18-11-1982. that the claim was within time and quoted the last sentence of the said Order whereby the Collector (Appeals) directed him to examine the claim on merits and pass necessary orders.
Hasmukhlal Amritlal Mehta And Others vs N.B. Sonavene And Others on 15 October, 1981
Forgetting further that he cannot reconsider the question which has already been decided by the Collector (Appeals) (See Hasmukhlal Amritlal Mehta v. N.B. Sonavene, (supra) and then as a result of the Order of the Collector (Appeals) the entire matter before him was not at large and he was not free to decide the case in his own way and also to decide the question of limitation again (See Scientific Instruments Company Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (supra). In a nutshell, he was bound by the Order dated 18-11-1982 passed by the Collector (Appeals) holding that the claim was within time. It is again unfortunate that while deciding the appeal filed by the appellants against the readjudication order dated 7-1-1985 the Collector (Appeals) also failed to take note of the earlier Order passed by his predecessor on 18-11-1982 which was referred to in the readjudication order passed by the Assistant Collector inasmuch as he was very much bound by the earlier Order passed by his predecessor in the instant case which was admittedly never reviewed or challenged in appeal by the department. Under these circumstances. I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order holding the claim of the appellants as time-barred is without jurisdiction and therefore it cannot be allowed to stay even for a moment.