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Peoples Insurance Co., Ltd. vs Benoy Bhusan Bhowmik And Ors. on 22 January, 1943 cites

Engineering Supplies Ltd. vs Dhandhania And Co. on 24 June, 1930

In the first place the expression "cause of action" has always been interpreted in this Court in the light of Lord Esher's dictum in Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 and as Sir George Rankin observed in Engineering Supplies Ltd. v. Dhandbania & Co , this is the only definition that will work if it is to be applied to cases of all kinds. It does not seem to us that the learned Judges of the Rangoon High 'Court were right in saying that the cause of action connotes different things in different parts of the Code. We cannot also agree with the view that the cause of action in suits for money due on a contract of insurance is the failure on the part of the insurance company to pay the money. The refusal of the insurer to pay the money may be a part of the cause of action, but the death of the assured is also a material part which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. The other matter upon which stress was laid by the Rangoon High Court is that as in Expln. 3 to Section 17 of the Code of 1882 "cause of action" in relation to suits on contract was exhaustively defined, the same meaning should be attached to it in Section 20(c) of the present Code of Civil Procedure even though the explanation occurring in the old Code has now been omitted. This, as we have already said, is the second part of Mr. Bose's contention and it is necessary to examine this proposition carefully. Section 17, Civil P.C. of 1882 as it originally stood, referred to the place; where the cause of action arose. It was not clear whether it meant the entire cause of action or a part of it. Act 7 of 1888 added an explanation, namely Expln, 3 to the section which ran as follows:
Calcutta High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 18 - Full Document

Bankey Behari And Anr. vs Ram Bahadur And Ors. on 5 February, 1918

9. This explanation was added for the purpose of making it clear that suits arising out of contract could be instituted in the Court within the local limits of which the cause of action arises either wholly or in part. Still, there was doubt as to whether this principle was applicable to all other suits which were not based on contract, and it was held in several cases that the introduction of the explanation did not effect any change in the law and that the cause of action did not mean the entire cause of action, vide Bankey Behari v. Pokhe Ram ('02) 25 All. 48. In Section 20 of the present Civil Procedure Code, the words "wholly or in part" have been added in Clause (e) to make it plain that all suits may be instituted where the cause of action arises either wholly or in part, and Expln. 3 of the old Code has been dropped as it is no longer necessary. We do not think that Expln. 3 to Section 17, Civil P.C., 1882, cuts down or restricts in any way the scope of Section 20(c) of the present Civil Procedure Code. That explanation is still good law in the sense that suits arising out of contract could still be instituted in the Court having local jurisdiction over any of the places specified in the explanation; but the explanation after it is repealed cannot be regarded as exhaustively laying down all the possible for in regard to suits based on contract.
Patna High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... vs The Bombay Trust Corporation, Limited on 26 November, 1929

10. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the view taken by the Court below is right and the Court of the 4th Subordinate Judge at Dacca had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We agree further with Mr. Chakravorty, that as the cause of action in this case arose within the jurisdiction of the Dacca Court and as the company has a branch office in that place the suit could be instituted at Dacca under Expln. 2 to Section 20, Civil P.C. Mr. Bose for the petitioner argues that the company cannot be said to carry on its business at Dacca as the only function of the branch office established there is to collect the premia and remit them to the head office. It has no jurisdiction to accept proposals. But the language of the explanation is perfectly clear and once it is established that a corporation has got a branch office at any place it shall be deemed in the eye of law to carry on its business at that place irrespective of the nature of the work that is actually carried on there. As the Privy Council observed in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombey Presidency v. Bombey Turst Corporation Ltd. :
Bombay High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 74 - Full Document
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