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1 - 10 of 17 (0.24 seconds)Section 138 in The Tamil Nadu Co-Operative Societies Act, 1983 [Entire Act]
Section 139 in The Tamil Nadu Co-Operative Societies Act, 1983 [Entire Act]
Section 137 in The Tamil Nadu Co-Operative Societies Act, 1983 [Entire Act]
State Of Punjab vs Vk Khanna & Ors on 30 November, 2000
28. In Common cause v. Union of India reported in 2004 (5) SCC 223, the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the investigation conducted by an officer, who lodged the F.I.R., could be assailed based on the principle "likelihood of bias". The Apex Court held that it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or baised. The Supreme Court further held that the formality of preparing the FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or like factor.
Secretary To The Government, Transport ... vs Munuswamy Mudaliar & Ors on 29 August, 1988
In Secretary to Govt. Transport Deptt., v. Munuswamy Mudaliar reported in 1988 (Supp.) SCC 651, a Superintending Engineer was appointed as an Arbitrator. His appointment was challenged by the Contractor on the ground of reasonable likelihood of bias. The Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 held as follows:
International Airport Authority Of ... vs K.D. Bali & Another on 29 March, 1988
13. This Court in International Authority of India v. K.D. Bali and Anr. Reported in (1988) 2 SCC 360, held that there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy that there was a real likelihood of bias. Vague suspicions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people should not be made the standard to regulate normal human conduct. In this country in numerous contracts with the Government, clauses requiring the Superintending Engineer or some official of the Govt. to be the arbitrator are there. It cannot be said that the Superintending Engineer, as such, cannot be entrusted with the work of arbitration and that an apprehension, simpliciter in the mind of the contractor without any tangible ground, would be a justification for removal. No other ground for the alleged apprehension was indicated in the pleadings before the learned Judge or the decision of the learned Judge. There was, in our opinion, no ground for removal of the arbitrator. Mere imagination of a ground cannot be an excuse for apprehending bias in the mind of the chosen arbitrator."