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1 - 10 of 10 (0.21 seconds)Article 144 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Bindhyachal Chand And Ors. vs Ram Gharib Chand And Ors. on 3 May, 1934
23. Reference may usefully be made in support of this view to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Bindhyachal v. Ram Gharib, AIR 1934 All 993 (L), and the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1940 Mad 798 (F).
The Official Receiver Of East Godavari vs Chava Govindaraju And Anr. on 23 April, 1940
We may also point out here that there is authority for the view that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to avoid the operation of Article 142 where it properly applies by merely omitting an allegation as to dispossession or by masquerading it as permissive possession. Thus it was held by Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Official Receiver v. Govindaraju AIR 1940 Mad 798 (PB) (F) that drafting a plaint in the manner which disguises the real nature of the suit will not help a plaintiff.
Section 13 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Article 134 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Gopaul Chunder Chuckerbutty vs Nilmoney Mitter And Ors. on 11 January, 1884
Reliance was placed in arriving at this view on an earlier case of the Calcuttta High Court in Gopal Chunder v. Nilmony Mitter, ILR 10 Cal 374 (G) in which it was held that a mere allegation of a tenancy was not" sufficient to relieve a plaintiff from the burden of proving that he or those under whom he claims had been in possession within 12 years, and that if this could be done, such a device could always be resorted to for the purpose of evading the law of limitation. We have no doubt, therefore, that the plaintiff's suit was a suit for possession based on an allegation of dispossession or discontinuance of possession.
Srimati Rani Hemanta Kumari Devi And ... vs Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur on 8 January, 1920
In Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur, 16 Mad LJ 272 (PC) (J), the facts were briefly these. The plaintiff had title in his favour and this was held to be conclusively established. The defendant rested his case on possession. The difference between the admitted possession and the period of limitation was extremely narrow being one year only. In these circumstances the Privy Council observed that the question of onus was important but their Lordships clearly stated that they would adhere to the principle which was enunciated in the case, 16 Ind App 23 (I), referred to above, and that it was for the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment to prove possession prior to the alleged dispossession i. e., within 12 years under Article 142. Their Lordships further observed that the initial fact of the plaintiff's title would come to his aid in an appraisal of the evidence with greater or less force according to the circumstances established in evidence.
Karuppanna Konar And Ors. vs Rangaswami Konar And Ors. on 5 May, 1927
In the second place, such third parties have no particular reason to be accurate as to who is the owner of the land adjoining their own, and, therefore, a mistake may easily creep in, in the mentioning of such boundaries. Boundaries may often be mentioned on imperfect knowledge or merely on hearsay information. We are, therefore, of the opinion that recitals of boundaries in documents between third parties should not be held to be admissible in evidence in proof of title of the parties seeking to rely upon them. Reference may be made in support of this view to Choonilall v. Nilmadhab, AIR 1925 Cal 1034 (A); Karuppanna v. Rangaswami, AIR 1928 Mad 105 (2) (B); Hari Ahir v. Sanghat Chacha, AIR 1934 Pat 617(2) (C); Nanak Chand v. Mian Mohammad, AIR 1936 Lah 114 (D) and Bhagwan Das v. Parabh Dial, AIR 1936 Lah 1005 (E).
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