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1 - 7 of 7 (0.47 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 12 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
S. Kalawati vs Durga Prasad & Anr on 2 May, 1975
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court In the case of S. KALAWATI v. DURGA PRASAD AND ANR . The learned Judges observed that after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this case it must be taken to be settled that a "decision in appeal" would imply that the Court had dealt judicially with the decision of the Court below after entertaining the appeal and delivered a Judgment thereafter.
Section 100 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Palghat Municipal Council vs National Motor Works Ltd., Coimbatore on 5 October, 1964
In this behalf he has drawn an analogy from the case Of PALGHAT MUNICIPAL COUNCIL BY THE COMMISSIONER v. NATIONAL MOTOR WORKS LTD . in which the Court Interpreted the words "sufficient cause". In that case the existence of circumstances mentioned in Section 14 of the Limitation Act were pressed as grounds to constitute sufficient cause in applying for condonation of delay. The learned Judge observed that the words "sufficient cause" under Section must be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice particularly when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. The existence of circumstances mentioned in Section 14 is sufficient ground for excusing the delay under Section 5. In that case the petitioner had presented an appeal to the High Court within time under a bona fide belief that appeal lay only to the High Court and the High Court in returning the appeal for proper presentation remarked that there was no bona fide doubt In the view of the petitioner in thinking that the High Court was the proper Court for entertaining the appeal and the appeal was presented to the District Court which was the proper Court with an application under Section 5. Here also it is not disputed that the appellant In fact had applied for certified copy of the order within two days of the pronouncement of the order of dismissal and obtained: he same on 21-11-1987. Therefore this itself should be construed as sufficient cause for condoning the delay as she must deemed to have been held bona fide to have waited for obtaining the certified copies. The trial Court was therefore not justified in finding that she wanted some how to circumvent the provisions of law particularly of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. In view of this admitted position of she applying for certified copy and obtaining them no such intention of circumventing the provision of law somehow can be inferred. In that view of the matter I hold that the Court below was not justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay and consequently dismissing the petition itself as barred by time.
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