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1 - 8 of 8 (0.49 seconds)Salam Chand Kannyaram vs Joogul Kissore Ramdeo on 25 August, 1927
In support: of his contention he relies on the decision in Salam Chand Kanayram v. Joogul Kishore Ramdeo (1927) 32 C.W.N. 114. I think that the point is not free from doubt. As regards the alleged difficulty in enforcing the order I have no doubt on the point Shamlal is a resident of British India and such order as the Court might make on this notice of motion could be transmitted for execution to the District Court where he ordinarily resides. The order made on a notice of motion of this kind would be an order within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code and could, therefore, be executed under Section 36 of the Code. In my opinion Section 36 is not limited to orders made only under the Code, but is applicable to all orders which could be included in the definition of the term "order" as defined in Section 2(14). Moreover, the order which the Court can make on a notice of motion of this kind is not necessarily for the arrest of the defaulting respondent. The Court has jurisdiction to impose a fine also. I, therefore; think that this contention of Mr. Maneckshaw is unsustainable.
Navivahoo vs Narotamdas Candas on 28 September, 1882
In Salam Chand v. Joogul Kishore, Rankin C. J. also considered that the observations of the Court in Raja of Ramnad v. Seetharam Chetty in distinguishing the case of Navivahoo v. Narotamdas Candas lend support to the contention that an order of arrest for contempt, being in its nature criminal, that jurisdiction is wider than the jurisdiction of the High Court on its original side to execute its decree by arrest.
Jayantilal Hiralal And Co. vs Waman Narayen Velinkar on 18 February, 1932
4. A notice of motion for contempt of the Court is a proceeding of a criminal nature and under the circumstances it is obligatory on the party who applies to the Court to state the precise acts complained of in the notice of motion. It is not permissible not to mention those particulars in the notice of motion and leave the respondent to ascertain, if he can, from the affidavit relied upon in support of the motion what the charges are. This principle is accepted in Jayantilal v. Waman . The terms of the present notice of motion clearly indicate the name of the receiver, the place at which the alleged cause of complaint took place, the nature of the complaint and also the date. In the present case the complaint is that the receiver's possession was disturbed by the respondents assaulting the receiver's men at the place and on the date mentioned in the notice of motion. I do not think it is obligatory on the plaintiffs to mention the evidence by which the charges made by them in the notice of motion are going to be supported. The particulars given in the present notice of motion appear to me to be sufficiently clear to inform the respondents to prepare themselves to meet the charge. I am unable to consider the particulars, as given in the notice of motion, insufficient, and, therefore, this contention of the respondents fails.
Section 145 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 145 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
S. Narayana Iyengar, Trustee Of Sri ... vs K.V. Desika Chariar on 28 February, 1933
Relying on this case, in Narayana Iyengar v. Desika Chariar (1933) I.L.R. 57 Mad. 35 it was held that once a Court is given jurisdiction, the necessary consequences flow from its exercise of such jurisdiction, without any express words, and, therefore, the Court's order can be enforced in the usual way in which orders made by the Courts are enforced.
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