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1 - 10 of 15 (0.38 seconds)THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015
Article 141 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
M/S Scg Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. vs Ks Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. on 12 February, 2019
"If the aforesaid provisions and explained principles
are literally and plainly applied to the facts of the present
case, the 120th day from the date of service of summons came
to an end with 06.05.2021 and the defendant, who had earlier
been granted time for filing its written statement on payment
of costs, forfeited such right with the end of 120th day, i.e.,
06.05.2021. However, it is required to be kept in view that the
provisions aforesaid and their interpretation in SCG
Contracts (supra) operate in normal and non-extraordinary
circumstances with the usual functioning of Courts. It is also
noteworthy that the above referred provisions of CPC are not
the only provisions of law which lay down mandatory
timelines for particular proceedings. The relevant principles,
in their normal and ordinary operation, are that such statutory
timelines are of mandatory character with little, or rather no,
discretion with the Adjudicating Authority for enlargement."
Sagufa Ahmed vs Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd on 18 September, 2020
"33. So far as the decision of this Court in Sagufa Ahmed8
(supra) is concerned, a few relevant factors related with the
said case need to be noticed. In that case, the appellants had
moved an application before Guwahati Bench of the National
Company Law Tribunal for winding up of the respondent
company. The petition was dismissed on 25.10.2019. The
appellants applied for a certified copy of the order dated
25.10.2019 only on 21 or 22.11.2019 and received the
certified copy of the order through their counsel on
19.12.2019. However, the appellants filed the statutory appeal
before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal only on
20.07.2020 with an application for condonation of delay. The
Appellate Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation
of delay on the ground that it had no power to condone the
delay beyond a period of 45 days. Consequently, the appeal
was also dismissed. In that case, it was indisputable that even
while counting from 19.12.2019, the period of 45 days
expired on 02.02.2020 and another period of 45 days, for
which the Appellate Tribunal could have condoned the delay,
also expired on 18.03.2020. To overcome this difficulty, the
appellants relied upon the aforesaid order dated 23.03.2020.