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1 - 10 of 11 (0.25 seconds)Section 77 in The Railways Act, 1989 [Entire Act]
Section 79 in The Railways Act, 1989 [Entire Act]
Indian Railways Act, 1890.
Trojan & Co. Ltd vs Rm. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar on 20 March, 1953
In Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa , their Lordships have held that the rule is well settled that damage due either for breach of contract or for tort or (sic) damages which, so far as money could compensate, would give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act. In the absence of any special circumstances the measure of damages could not be the amount of loss ultimately sustained by the representee. It could only be the difference between the price which he paid and the price which he would have received if he had resold them in the market forthwith after the purchases, provided of-course that there was a fair market then. The question to be decided is such a case was what could the plaintiff have obtained if he had resold forthwith what he was induced to purchase by fraud of the defendants. In other words, the mode of dealing with damages in such a suit was to see what it would have cost him to get out of the situation. i. e. how much worse off was his estate owing to the bargain in which he entered into.
Section 80 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
The State Of Madras vs C.P. Agencies And Anr. on 25 August, 1959
This decision went in appeal and the appellate decision is reported in State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies . The only controversy in the appeal was as regards the validity of the notice under Section 80. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out at page 1310 that the object of Section 80 was manifestly to give the Government or the public officer sufficient notice of the case which was proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he might consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. In order to enable the Government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it was necessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim was founded and the precise reliefs asked for. Their Lordships also held that Section 80 peremptorily required that no suit shall be filed against the Government or a public officer in respect of anything done in his official capacity until after the expiry of two months from the service of a notice in the manner therein prescribed stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the reliefs which he claimed. The name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and reliefs claimed had been sufficiently stated in the notice and as the cause of action was also found to have been sufficiently stated, their Lordships upheld the notice in that case as a valid notice.
Section 140 in The Railways Act, 1989 [Entire Act]
Chandulal Vadilal vs Government Of The Province Of Bombay on 5 August, 1942
At page 1311 also their Lordships also approved the observations of Pollock C. B. in Jones v. Nicholls, as aforesaid, "we must import a little common sense into notices of this kind", and the observations of Beaumont C. J. in Chandulal Vadilal v. Govt. of Bombay A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 138, "one must construe Section 80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed. " Their Lordships felt that the relief claimed in para 2 of the notice was that the Madras Government should pay up the amount and it was held that on a fair reading of the notice it could be said that all the facts were sufficiently stated as required by Section 80 so as to enable the Government to know what the plaintiff s claim was about and whether the claim should be conceded or resisted. It is true that the point which was canvassed before the Nagpur High Court in para 10 of the aforesaid judgment to which I have already referred to was not in terms canvassed before the Supreme Court. The fact, however, remains that the validity of this notice has been upheld by reading the notice by importing common sense consistent with the object underlying Section 80.
State Of Bombay vs N.T. Advani on 29 January, 1962
Mr. Nanavati also pointed out a decision in the State of Bombay v. Dr. N.T. Advani , at page 16. In that case it was contended that the notice given by the plaintiff was invalid since it was not addressed to the Government but was addressed to the Secretary to the Government. A reference to Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that the notice was not required to be addressed to the Government. Section 80 required that the notice should contain the cause of action, the name, description, and the place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claimed and that it must be left to the Secretary to the Government. It was, therefore, held that all the requirements were complied with on reading the notice in a rational and sensible manner. It is not the function of the Court to prick holes in the notice to invalidate it. It was also held that even though the notice was addressed to the Secretary to the Government it had reached proper quarter and, therefore, requirements of Section 80 had been complied with. While appreciating this contention, it must be kept in mind that under Section 79 in case of a suit against the Central Government the defendant has to be the Union of India. There is no dispute about the requirements of Section 79 being not complied with. Section 80 then merely provides that no suit shall be instituted against the Government until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office... (b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it related to a railway, the General Manager of that railway...stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claimed and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. Thus, in the case of a suit relating to railway against the Union of India what Section 80 requires is that the notice must be delivered or left at the office of the General Manager of that railway with the necessary particulars specified therein and the plaint must contain a statement that such notice had been so delivered or left. Mr. Nanavati rightly contended that for delivering a notice to the General Manager or leaving it at his office, the General Manager would ordinarily be the addressee. What is, therefore, material for the purpose of Section 80 is that the notice must be given of the proposed suit against the Central Government so that the Central Government would have a warning and would be in a position to consider whether to settle the plaintiff's claim or to contest the same. Even Mr. Daru argued that the General Manager is a mere channel. What he contends, however is that every notice under Section 80 in a case of a suit relating to a railway must be addressed "to the Union of India through the General Manager". Section 80 no where specifies such a relinquishment. The argument advanced by Mr. Daru is solely based on the aforesaid passage of Gajendragadkar J. (as he than was) which I have already referred to and which no where lays down this proposition. No doubt a distinction has to be made when the claim is against the General Manager personally, and he is intended to be sued as such because Section 80 requires a notice not only in the case when the suit is instituted against the Government but also in the case of a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by that officer in his official capacity. Therefore, where a notice is given to the General Manager in his capacity as a public officer for a suit proposed to be filed against him, such a notice could not be treated as one given to the Union of India. On the other hand, if the General Manager is merely a channel for delivery of the statutory notice under Section 80 which is proposed to be given for the suit to be filed against the Central Government, I would have to construe the relevant averments in the notice itself. If the notice would leave no doubt in the mind of the General Manager that he was not meeting a personal claim but it was a notice of a claim against railway administration of an intended suit against the Union of India, such a notice could by no stretch of imagination be said to be a notice against the General Manager, but would always be a notice given to the Central Government, even though it might be delivered to the General Manager or left at his office as required by Section 80 by being addressed to him.