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1 - 10 of 11 (0.21 seconds)Section 3 in Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Somu Achari vs Singara Achari And Anr. on 14 February, 1945
8. Mr. Venkataraman, counsel for the appellant contends that but -for the mortgage transaction, dated 1st January, 1943, Exhibit A-1, the rental deed would not have come into existence and the rental deed itself had been entered into as a lease back arrangement by the mortgagee in favour of the mortgagor and the rental amount cannot be none other than 'interest' payable to the mortgagee and therefore the sub-section would be attracted and hence relief can be claimed after 1st March, 1972. For this purpose, he refers to the decision in Somu Achari v. Singara Achari (1945) 2 M.L.J. 17 : A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 407 to show that in a case where there is a charge of the unpaid vendor for which a promissory note comes into existence, still the charge cannot be put an end to and the filing of a suit on the promissory note and obtaining a decree thereon, will be concerned only to the realisation of the amount covered by that promissory note. In this contest it will be useful to refer to the order passed in S.A. No. 785 of 1965 wherein it has been stated that
the appellant herein is to deposit into Court all arrears of rent due from March, 1951 onwards upto date, that is, 10th August, 1955 within three months from that date, that is, on or before 10th October, 1955 and should pay regularly future rent or in the alternative the defendants should furnish security to the satisfaction of this Court for all arrears of rent upto date.
T.V. Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar vs M. Narasimha Mudaliar on 27 April, 1951
The Court had the occasion to consider the earlier decisions rendered in Srinivasaraghava Ayyangar v. Narasihnha Mudaliar Sankara Ayyer v. Yagappan Servai (1940) 2 M.L.J. 874 : 52 L.W. 830 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad.
Kamakshi Ammal And Ors. vs Pappathi Alias Kamalambai on 24 January, 1975
7. The second objection taken is that what is now sought to be enforced is only the security and not the rental amount covered by 'the decree. For this Mr. Ram Mohan, relies upon the decision rendered in Kamakshi Ammal v. Pappathi alias Kamalambal (1976) 2 M.L.J. 60 : 89 L.W. 124 : I.L.R. (1976) Mad. 145 : A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 292 which arose under Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act in which the question arose as to what could be the character of the amount deposited in Court as arrears of rent and whether it could be construed as outstanding within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. It was held therein, that when
The Legislature has designedly used the expression 'outstanding (in Section 3), it means that if the tenant had already paid in full or in part the rent payable, he had no right to seek for recovery of it from the landlord.... In the instant case, the amount in Court deposit could not be said to be arrears of rent or an outstanding rent. It had lost the impress of rent because of the peculiar situation when the money came to Court pursuant to orders of Court, in an application for stay of the execution of a money decree. Taking all these factors into consideration, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to the amount in Court deposit and not the respondents.
V. Kalyanasundaram Pillai vs R.M.L.S. Chockalingam Chettiar on 18 April, 1951
9. Mr. Venkataraman, counsel for the appellant contended that since the amount covered by the decree is nothing but arrears of rent, straightaway the sub-section gets applied and by virtue of the recent amendment in Act VIII of 1973, the entire interest prior to 1st March, 1972 being wiped out, the decree amount cannot be realised 'from the appellant. The Sub-section (9)(a)(i) of the Act existed even before 1972 and the point as to whether the rent paid under a lease back arrangement by the mortgagor will be interest or only rent had come up for consideration before this Court even as early as 1952, and it was decided in Kalyanasundaram v. Chockalingam that:
Muthuswami Odayar vs Savarimuthu Odayar on 5 October, 1962
In. Muthuswamy Odayar v. Savarimuthu Odayar (1963) 1 M.L.J. 171 : 76 L.W. 63 : I.L.R. 1963 Mad. 274 (Mad.) : A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 249 (F.B.) the Full Bench has held that "the provisions of Section 9-A of the Act can be invoked only at the time of the redemption of the mortgage, and that no doubt the subsection deems rent due as interest, but it cannot mean that the rents that had been already paid should also be deemed to be interest. The word 'due' would mean 'still remains unpaid' and there being nothing in the statute to extend its meaning so as to include really what is not due, the fiction will come into play only when the claim is for redemption". Therefore it is quite obvious that whenever there is a lease-back arrangement and a certain amount of rent becomes payable, it has to be worked out as an independent transaction based on the lease deed or lease arrangement. The lessee claiming to be an agriculturist may seek relief under amended Act VIII of 1973, for wiping out the interest payable under the decree preceding 1st March, 1972. But he cannot ask for the wiping out of the liability to pay the lease amount covered by the suit. This Court had been taking the consistent view, as pointed out above, that Section 9-A of the Act is a Code by itself, and that it can be invoked by a mortgagor only if he files a suit for redemption. In this case, the mortgagor-lessee had not filed any suit for redemption. The rent payable by him under ' Exhibit A-1 can be deemed to be interest by the fiction contemplated under the sub-section if only he can invoke Section 9-A of the Act. He being a mortgagor, the decisions above referred to, preclude him from invoking the sub-section, since he had not filed any suit for redemption. This is not a case where subsequent to Act VIII of 1973, a mortgage decree obtained by a mortgagee, is sought to be amended by invoking Section 19 of the Act. When he does not have the legal right to invoke Section 9-A, he cannot take advantage of the fiction contemplated under the sub-section, merely because the claim is nothing but rent that became payable by the mortgagor on a lease-back arrangement to the mortgagee during the subsistence of a mortgage. This Court in the decisions above referred to, has held that it has to be treated as a separate transaction, and so long as the lease is not held to be invalid, the mortgagor-lessee is bound to satisfy such decrees, unless he comes by way of redemption. In this case, the mortgage transaction had come to an end by 1961, and the decree in O.S. No. 291 of 1961 had been obtained, subsequently, representing nothing but the rental amount covered by an independent transaction under Exhibit A-1 and therefore the appellant herein cannot claim that the decree amount is only interest payable under the mortgage and covered by the fiction contemplated under the sub-section.
Easoop Alias Mani Rowthen And Ors. vs Bookutty Umma And Ors. on 13 September, 1955
10. On the 4th point, I have already referred to the binding decisions of this Court, wherein it has been held that Section 9-A of the Act is a Code by itself and it can only be taken advantage of under the circumstances contemplated therein. Counsel for the appellant refers me to the decision rendered in Easoop v. Rookutty Umma (1956) 1 M.L.J. 427 : A.I.R. 1956 Mad 259 in which the point arose as to whether an application under Section 19-A of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act', 1938, to scale down a mortgage debt as per the provisions of Section 9-A of that Act, is maintainable, and to get the necessary declaration and it was held that Section 19-A of the Act cannot be controlled by Section 9-A, since it does not contain any overriding or self-contained provision which can inhibit the procedure contemplated under Section 19-A of the Act being enforced.
V. Venkatanarayana Rao vs Champalal Savansukha And Anr. on 4 December, 1953
193 and Venkatanarayana Rao v. C. Savansukha and held that such decisions will not be of any relevance for considering the question as to whether Section 19-A of the Act can be controlled by Section 9-A of the Act. It was further held therein that any further remedy which the mortgagor might claim as and by way of recovery of possession or otherwise, could be had only in a suit and not in a proceeding under Section 19-A of the Act but by the other modes open to him under law.
Gopal Chettiar vs Arumugha Naicker on 19 January, 1961
This view was 'followed in Gopal Chettiar v. Arumugha Naicker (1962) 1 M.L.J. 4 wherein it was held that: