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1 - 10 of 11 (0.21 seconds)The General Clauses Act, 1897
Vama Dava Desikar vs Murugesa Mudali on 11 July, 1905
Therefore, when a month is used in a statute that may be interpreted to mean a period of 30 days as held in Varna Dava Desihar v. Murugesa Mudali [1906] 29 ILR 75 (Mad). The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has taken a different view in this respect in V. S. Metha, In re, AIR 1970 AP 234. According to the Andhra Pradesh High Court the words "three months" employed in Section 106 of the Factories Act will mean only the three calendar months.
Jiwanlal Achariya vs Rameshwarlal Agarwalla on 26 August, 1966
This court in a Division Bench in Manoj K. Seth v. R. J. Fernandez [1991] 2 KLT 65 ; [1992] 73 Comp Cas 441 has relied upon the principle pronounced by the Supreme Court in Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla, AIR 1967 SC 1118.
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 106 in The Factories Act, 1948 [Entire Act]
Section 482 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Manoj K. Seth vs R.J. Fernandez on 20 June, 1991
This court in a Division Bench in Manoj K. Seth v. R. J. Fernandez [1991] 2 KLT 65 ; [1992] 73 Comp Cas 441 has relied upon the principle pronounced by the Supreme Court in Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla, AIR 1967 SC 1118.
Sashi Kumar Banerjee And Ors. vs Mrs. D.J. Hill And Ors. on 20 July, 1950
In that view, I am in full agreement with the decision taken by the High Courts of Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh referred to above. When on the footing of the days covered by the British calendar month, the period of limitation in the case on hand is calculated, the cheque ought to have been presented in the bank for collection on or before May 16, 1995. But in this case, as pointed above, the cheque had been presented for collection only on May 17, 1995, which is clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, the time barred prosecution cannot be launched as has been specifically provided in Section 138 of the Act. The order of the learned magistrate passed in C. M. P. No. 8609 of 1996 that the date of the cheque must be
excluded in calculating the period of limitation is erroneous and it calls for interference by this court. Accordingly, not only the order of the learned magistrate passed in the above C. M. P. is quashed but also the entire proceedings in C. C. No. 582 of 1995 stand quashed. In the result Crl. M. C. is allowed.