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1 - 9 of 9 (0.21 seconds)Shah Ambalal Chhotalal And Ors. vs Shah Babaldas Dayabhai And Ors. on 12 April, 1962
L.R. 972-a view subsequently overruled by this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) that if deposits are made by the tenant and accepted by the Court, the acceptance of the deposits would be tantamount to an order having been passed by the Court fixing a date as contemplated in Section 12(3)(b). If this view were correct, no application for fixing a date was necessary and the respondent could be held to have complied with the requirements of Section 12(3)(b). But the legal position was not free from doubt and the respondent, therefore, made the application dated 4th September 1958 to fix a date under Section 12(3)(b), so that on such date being fixed, the full amount of standard rent and permitted increases deposited by the respondent could be said to have been tendered in Court by the respondent on or before such date fixed by the Court and the requirements of Section 12(3)(b) would be satisfied. The learned trial Judge, however, rejected the application on the view that the application could not be made after the first day of hearing of the suit. This was, for reasons which we have pointed out above, clearly wrong. The application was competent under Section 12(3)(b) and the learned trial Judge should have granted the application. If the learned trial Judge had granted the application and fixed any date prior to the date of delivery of the judgment, the respondent would have been within the protection of Section 12(3)(b). The learned District Judge was, therefore, right in according the protection of Section 12(3)(b) to the respondent.
The Delhi Rent Act, 1995
Allanur Rasulla vs Balchand Ramji on 27 October, 1961
3. When the revision application originally came up for hearing before me sitting as a single Judge, one of the questions agitated before me was whether the application made by the respondent to the learned trial Judge to fix a date under Section 12(3)(b) was rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge. It was contended before me on behalf of the petitioners that the learned trial Judge was not only justified but was bound to reject the application inasmuch as the application was made after the first day of hearing of the suit. The argument urged on behalf of the petitioners was that an application for fixation of a date under, Section 12(3)(b) had to be made on the first day of hearing of the suit and could not be made subsequently and that the application made by the respondent was, therefore, rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge. The petitioners in support of this contention relied on a decision of Raju J. in Allanur v. Balchand (1962) III G.L.R. 182.
The Bombay University Act, 1974
Section 3 in The Bombay University Act, 1974 [Entire Act]
Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed vs Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai on 22 October, 1963
It is clear from Sub-section (3)(b) that if the tenant has failed to pay the arrears due on the first day of the hearing of the suit, it is for him to apply to the Court to fix another date for payment and also to apply to the Court for the determination of costs of that suit in order to enable him to pay or tender in Court such amount
These observations clearly show that the Division Bench contemplated an application by the tenant for fixing another date for payment after the first day of hearing of the suit. The decision of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (1964) V G.L.R. 55, also supports the view we are taking. In that case the Supreme Court interpreted Sub-section (3)(b) of Section 12 and pointed out how that sub-section was to be worked out in its practical application. Shah J., speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court said:
The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd vs Pothan Joseph on 27 April, 1960
9. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the learned trial Judge having rejected the application of the respondent for fixing a date under Section 12(3)(b) in the exercise of his discretion, the learned District Judge was not entitled to interfere with the exercise of the discretion unless he came to the conclusion that the discretion was exercised unreasonably or capriciously or that in the exercise of that discretion the learned trial Judge had adopted an unjudicial approach and in support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. P. Joseph . This decision no doubt lays down the principle on which an appellate Court would be entitled to interfere with the exercise of discretion of the trial Court, but it is difficult to see how that principle has any application to the facts of the present case. Here we find that the learned trial Judge rejected the application of the respondent for fixing a date under Section 12(3)(b) on the ground that the application was made after the first day of hearing of the suit. This was clearly an erroneous ground based on misinterpretation of Section 12(3)(b). Moreover, even if we take the view that in rejecting the application the learned trial Judge exercised his discretion, the learned trial Judge clearly acted unreasonably or capriciously in exercising his discretion since he overlooked the fact that a large amount in excess of the amount of standard rent and permitted increases due upto the date of the application had already been deposited by the respondent in Court and the Court had accepted the deposit of such amount and all that the respondent sought by the application was merely fixation of a date for the purpose of bringing the deposit of such amount within the terms of Section 12(3)(b). We must, therefore, hold that the respondent was entitled to the protection of Section 12(3)(b) and the learned District Judge was right in taking the view that the original petitioner was not entitled to obtain a decree for eviction against the respondent.
Gulam Hussein Kalumia vs Mahomed Umar Azizulla on 10 January, 1958
8. Now what happened in the present case was that the respondent deposited in Court the full amount of standard rent and permitted increases prior to 4th September 1958 but he did so without obtaining an order of the Court fixing a date for payment or tender of such amount. This was not strictly in accord with the provisions of Section 12(3)(b). The respondent, therefore, made an application dated 4th September 1958 to the Court for fixing a date under Section 12(3)(b) and the obvious reason why the application was made was to bring the deposit of the full amount of standard rent and permitted increases made by him withing the terms of Sub-section (3)(b) of Section 12. Now at one time a view was taken and that was also the view taken by Chagla C. J. in Gulam Hussein v Mahomed Umar, 60 Bom.
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