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1 - 10 of 20 (0.39 seconds)Section 13 in The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [Entire Act]
The Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement Of Security Interest Act, 2002
The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993
Section 17 in The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [Entire Act]
Section 19 in The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [Entire Act]
Section 20 in The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [Entire Act]
Harbanslal Sahnia And Anr. vs Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. And Ors. on 20 December, 2002
In the light of the above decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, the writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking to set aside the possession notice issued to her long back is legally not sustainable. We are of the considered view that this petition has been filed only to drag on the proceedings and to evade repayment of the loan. That be so, the petitioner has no legal right to compel the bank to accept the one time settlement offer made by her.
Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs Antarim Zila Parishad Muzaffar Nagar on 2 August, 1968
18. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order, (underlining added).