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1 - 6 of 6 (0.28 seconds)Union Of India And Ors vs Mohd. Ramzan Khan on 20 November, 1990
Thus the matter is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Non supply of copies of part of the enquiry report and statement of persons whose evidence had been recorded behind the back of the respondent would vitiate the entire proceedings. The enquiry officer also went beyond his brief to hold that there was leakage of paper and that the respondent No. 1 was informed about the paper and had coached his son accordingly. The serious allegation was made against the respondent and he was not even provided sufficient opportunity to defined himself. There is a serious allegation which has been supported by the facts of the case that the respondent was never given the complete report of the enquiry officer and only the alleged relevant extracts of the report were annexed with the charge-sheet and supplied to him. The learned Single Judge correctly came to the conclusion and there is no error of law in the finding that seriously prejudice was caused to the respondent by withholding portions of the enquiry report. We otherwise cannot follow was to why the disciplinary authority was hesitant in supplying the complete report of the enquiry officer as well as the statement of certain witnesses to the respondent. The disciplinary authority also gravely erred in examining two witnesses behind the back of the respondent and having informal consultation with others and respondent was not confronted with the same nor he was provided sufficient opportunity in this regard The Supreme Court has clearly held in Union of India v. Mohd.Ramzan Khan (supra) that principles of natural justice demand that the relevant documents must be supplied to the delinquent officer and the delinquent is entitled to know the material being used against him.
Jamshedpur Engineering & Machine ... vs Union Of India And Ors. on 1 August, 1990
(16) The next authority cited is 1968 (Vol. 70) Income Tax Reports 807, Jamshedpur Engineering and Machine Manufacturing Co. P. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. The learned Judges in that case held as follows : "HEREagain, we find it difficult to uphold this submission. The order which the petitioner seeks to enforce, was made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, on December 3, 1958, and the officers to whom that order gives directions are also outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Prima facia, therefore, this Court would not have territorial jurisdiction either over the officers to whom writ is sought to go or over the cause of action from which the petitioner is feeling aggrieved. The contention that since the money realised from the petitioner has gone to the coffers of the Union of India and this Court has merely to direct the Union of India to refund the amount, has the merit of ingenuity, but appears to us to be too tenuous to sustain the plea of jurisdiction of this Court, on the facts and circumstances of the present case. The order of refund has to be made by appropriate authorities and nothing cogent has been urged to convince us that such an appropriate authority is within our jurisdiction. The technical ovation of the coffers of the Union of India in Delhi, is, in our opinion, too tenuous a basis for assuming jurisdiction over the controversy before us".
Collector Of Customs, Calcutta vs East India Commercial Co. Ltd on 30 April, 1962
(17) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and Others, , has dealt with the question and came to the following conclusion at page 1126: "THE question therefore turns on whether the order of the original authority becomes merged in the order of the appellate authority even where the appellate authority merely dismisses the appeal without any modification of the order of the original authority. It is obvious that when an appeal is made, the appellate authority can do one of three things, namely, (i) it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus confirm the order without any modification. It is not disputed that in the first two cases where the order of the original authority is either reversed or modified it is the order of the appellate authority which is the operative order and if the High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ to the appellate authority it cannot issue a writ to the original authority. The question therefore is whether there is any difference between these two cases and the third case where the appellate authority dismisses the appeal and thus confirms the order of the original authority. It seems to us that on principle it is difficult to draw a distinction between the first two kinds of orders passed by the appellate authority and the third kind of order passed by it. In all these three cases after the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification. Therefore, if the appellate authority is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court it seems difficult to hold even in a case where the appellate authority has confirmed the order of the original authority that the High Court can issue a writ to the original authority which may even have the effect of setting aside the order of the original authority when it cannot issue a writ to the appellate authority which has confirmed the order of the original authority. In effect, by issuing a writ to the original authority setting aside its order, the High Court would be interfering with the order of the appellate authority which had confirmed the order of the original authority even though it has no territorial jurisdiction to issue any writ to the appellate authority. We therefore feel that on principle when once an order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority which is located beyond the territorial Jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of the latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of; and as the High Court can not issue a writ against the appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the original authority and dismissed the appeal".
Kashinath Dikshita vs Union Of India (Uoi)And Ors. on 15 May, 1986
(21) It is also well settled that the enquiry is vitiated if the delinquent officer is able to establish prejudice caused to him by non supply of documents considere.d at the stage of preliminary enquiry and which ultimately resulted in the passing of the" impugned order. The learned Single Judge noticed that there was no dispute that respondent No. 1 was not supplied with the statements of those persons which had been recorded earlier, which persons subsequently appeared as witnesses during the course of the enquiry proceedings against him. Reference was also made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and Others, . The learned Single Judge has correctly quoted the following passage in his judgment which will squarely cover the case of respondent No. 1 : The extracts quoted hereinabove leave no room for doubt that the disciplinary authority refused to furnish to the appellant copies of documents and copies of statements. When a Government servant is facing a disciplinary proceedings, he is entitled to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges against him in an effective manner. And no one facing a departmental enquiry can effectively meet the charges unless the copies of the relevant statements and documents to be used against him are made available to him. In the absence of such copies, how can the concerned employee predate his defense, cross-examine the witnesses, and point out the inconsistencies with a view to show that the allegations are incredible : Be that as it may, even without going into minute details it ts evident that the appellant was entitled to have an access to the documents and statements throughout the course of the enquiry. He would have needed these documents and statements in order to cross-examine the 38 witnesses who were produced at the enquiry to establish the charges against him. So also at the time of arguments, he would have needed the copies of the documents. So also he would have needed the copies of the documents to enable him to effectively cross examine the witnesses with reference to the contents of the documents. It is obvious that he could not have done so if copies had not been made available to him. Taking an overall view of the matter we have no doubt in ous mind that the appellant has been denied a reasonable opportunity of exonerating himself. We do not consider it necessary to quote extensively from the authorities cited on behalf of the parties, beyond making passing reference to some of the citations, for whether or not there has been a denial to afford a reasonable opportunity in the back drop of this case must substantially depend upon the facts pertaining to this matter". The learned Judge has held that non supply of statement of persons, which had been recorded by the preliminary enquiry committee and who were then examined as witnesses by the Enquiry Officer was not warranted. These statements obviously would have been very relevant to enable the respondent No. 1 to prepare his defense and to effectively examine or cross-examine such witnesses when they appeared before the Enquiry Officer. The conclusions of the learned single Judge are based on the admitted facts on record and the established law is clearly in favor of the respondent that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice and denial of reasonable opportunity.
Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Bombay vs Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni ... on 17 November, 1982
(23) We may notice that respondent had requested to be assisted by legal adviser or one of his colleague. This request was not considered by the Enquiry Officer and in a way the same was declined. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the respondent had no experience at all in examining the witnesses and no effective cross-examination had been done in his behalf. The appellants ought to have provided reasonable assistance to respondent to defend himself so that no injustice was done. Reference may be made to the case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendra Nadkarnt & Others, which lays down that refusal to grant such request would amount to denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated. We may also record our disapproval in the manner the respondent has been treated. It is needless to go further into the merits of the rival contentions of the parties but it is an admitted fact that the respondent bad a brilliant academic career and he has been a visiting Professor at various Universities including Wisconsin University in U.S.A. He made outstanding contribution to the Mathematical Science and he was honoured jointly with Professor R. Narasimhan, with the prestigious Shanti Swaroop Bhatnagar Award. He has also been recipient of several other honours and it may not be necessary to discuss them in detail. The whole trouble started on the complaint of Dr. V.M. Saundalgekar on or about 5th July, 1978. The respondent brought to the notice of the Director that his son Shri Navin Jain was a candidate for the admission test and he wanted to go on casual leave w.e.f. 6th July, 1978. The examination for Mathematics was to be conducted on 11th July, 1973 and 8th and 9th July being holidays, the respondent went on leave from 10th to 12th July, 1978 which would indicate that he did not actively participate in any proceedings concerning his son. The Director being aware of the whole issue could have changed the examiners who were alleged to have been appointed by the respondent. He however maintained his silence and did not act in this regard. It will also be far fetched to conclude that the examiners who were eminent professors in their own right would confer undue advantage on the son of the respondent on mere asking. It is also relevant to point out that the son of the respondent derived no benefit and did not get admission in the Institute. The respondent had to go through the agony of facing the disciplinary proceedings and litigating in this Court for about nine years of the latter part of his career. The Director and other persons responsible ought to have acted when the respondent informed them about the participation of his son in the admission proceedings.
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