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1 - 10 of 17 (0.41 seconds)N. Balakrishnan vs M. Krishnamurthy on 3 September, 1998
9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by
hard and fast rules.
New India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult on 10 October, 1975
In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti
Misra (1975 (2) SCC 840) this Court held that discretion
given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as
to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The
expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal
construction.
H.H. Brij Indar Singh vs Lala Kanshi Ram on 19 July, 1917
In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918)
45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to
exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the
appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the
appeal.
Shakuntala Devi Jain vs Kuntal Kumari And Ors. on 5 September, 1968
In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari(AIR 1969
SC 575) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of
bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a
party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application
must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be
condoned.
Concord Of India Insurance Co Ltd vs Nirmala Devi And Ors on 16 April, 1979
In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala
Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365] which is a case of negligence of the
counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his
remedy, the default in delay was condoned.
Lala Mata Din vs A. Narayanan on 25 August, 1969
In Lala Mata Din
v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770], this Court had held that
there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by
itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is
always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was
Crl. L.P.275/2014 etc. Page 6 of 12
merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it
was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona
fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.
Milvi Devi vs Dina Nath on 11 January, 1982
In Milavi Devi
v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366], it was held that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within
the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can
reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order
made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter
for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was
condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits.
State (Nct Of Delhi) vs Ahmed Jaan on 12 August, 2008
16. While there is no quarrel with the proposition that in order to succeed
in an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act an
applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by sufficient
cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It has also
been held that delay must not be on account of any inaction or
negligence on behalf of the appellant. Delay in filing appeals has been
a subject matter of decision before the Apex Court in a large number
of cases. It has been inter alia held by the Apex Court that Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial
justice to the party. It would be useful to refer to another decision of
the Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan,
reported at (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 582. Relevant portion of
the judgment reads as under:
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & ... vs Mst. Katiji & Ors on 19 February, 1987
In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2
SCC 107], a Bench of two Judges considered the question of
the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held
that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do
substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on
merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic
to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-
purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
But the message does not appear to have percolated down to
all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that
the expression/every day's delay must be explained does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine
must be applied in a rational common sense, pragmatic
manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is
Crl. L.P.275/2014 etc. Page 7 of 12
occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence,
or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-
oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient
cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal.
The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation
and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine
of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the
State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and
the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is
no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the
State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.