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1 - 10 of 28 (1.17 seconds)Article 19 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 505 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar And Ors. vs Emperor on 10 July, 1939
He referred to the judgment of the
Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case
(2)
802
and to the judgment of the Privy Council to the
contrary in King Emperor v. Sada Shiv Narayan (1).
After having pointed out the divergency of opinion
between the Federal Court of India and the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the
learned Judge made the following observations in
order to explaim why the term "sedition" was not
specifically mentioned in Art. 19(2) of the
Constitution:
R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union Of India(With Connected ... on 9 April, 1957
We do not think it necessary to discuss or to
refer in detail to the authorities cited and
discussed in the reported case R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India (1) at pages
940 to 952. We may add that the provisions of the
impugned sections, impose restrictions on the
fundamental freedom of speech and expression, but
those restrictions cannot but be said to be in the
interest of public order and within the ambit of
permissible legislative interference with that
fundamental right.
Brij Bhushan And Another vs The State Of Delhi on 26 May, 1950
In Brij Bhushan case (1), Fazl Ali, J., who was
again the dissenting judge, gave his reasons to
greater detail.
King-Emperor vs Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao on 18 February, 1947
In this connection it may be recalled that
the Federal Court had, in defining sedition
in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King
Emperor (2) held that "the acts or words
complained of must either incite to disorder
or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men
that that is their intention or tendency",
but the Privy Council overruled that decision
and emphatically reaffirmed the view
expressed in Tilak's case to the effect that
"the offence consisted in exciting or
attempting to excite in others certain bad
feelings towards the Government and not in
exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or
rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance,
great or small" -King Emperor v. Sadashiv
Narayan Bhalerao. Deletion of the word
"sedition" from the draft article 13(2),
therefore, shows that criticism of Government
exciting disaffection or bad feelings toward
it is not to be regarded as a justifying
ground for restricting the freedom of
expression and of the press, unless it is
such as to undermine the security of or tend
to overthrow the State. It is also
significant that the corresponding
800
Irish formula of "undermining the public
order or the authority of the State" (article
40(6)(i) of the Constitution of Fire, 1937)
did not apparently find favour with the
framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus,
very narrow and stringent limits have been
set to permissible legislative abridgement of
the right of free speech and expression, and
this was doubtless due to the realisation
that freedom of speech and of the press lay
at the foundation of all domocratic
organisations, for without free political
discussion no public education, so essential
for the proper functioning of the processes
of popular government, is possible, freedom
of such amplitude might involve risks of
abuse. But the framers of the Constitution
may well have reflected, with Madison who was
"the leading spirit in the preparation of the
First Amendment of the Federal Constitution"
Government of India Act, 1935
Queen-Empress vs Jogendra Chunder Bose And Ors. on 25 August, 1891
In this connection
reference was made to the observations of
Petheram, C.J. in Queen-Empress v. Jogender
Bose(1). It was also contended that the
appellant's comments
790
had not exceeded what in England would be
considered within the functions of a Public
journalist, and that the misdirection complained
of was of the greatest importance not merely to
the affected person but to the whole of the Indian
Press and also to all her Majesty's subjects; and
that it injuriously affected the liberty of the
press and the right to free speech in public
meetings. But in spite of the strong appeal made
on behalf of the petitioner for special leave, the
Lord Chancellor, delivering the opinion of the
Judicial Committee, while dismissing the
application, observed that taking a view of the
whole of the summing up they did not see any
reason to dissent from it, and that keeping in
view the rules which Their Lordships observed in
the matter of granting leave to appeal in criminal
cases, they did not think that the case raised
questions which deserve further consideration by
the Privy Council.