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Mihir Kumar Ghosh vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 9 December, 1988 cites

S. Guin & Others vs Grindlays Bank Ltd on 11 December, 1985

12. The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Gain v. Grindlays Bank Ltd. . The facts thereof may call for a somewhat pointed notice. The accused persons therein were charged under Section 341, I.P.C. read with Section 35AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 for an offence allegedly committed by them on the 31st of October, 1977. There was no delay in investigation and trial and the Magistrate, by its judgment dated 27th of June, 1978 (i.e. after barely eight months), acquitted the accused persons. An appeal against the acquittal was taken before the Calcutta High Court which was apparently admitted but could not come up for final hearing till six years. On the 19th December, 1984, the High Court set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for re-tr ial afresh. On appeal by the accused appellants their Lordships set aside the High Court judgment and restored the acquittal with the following unequivocal and categoric observations :
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 46 - E S Venkataramiah - Full Document

Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978

Even under our Constitution though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right. It is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India . Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and Just'. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair and just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial is meant reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21."
Supreme Court of India Cites 134 - Cited by 1982 - M H Beg - Full Document

T.V. Vatheeswaran vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 16 February, 1983

8. In the light of the aforesaid long time of unbroken precedents of the final court itself, it is not possible for one to hold that even though it has been declared now in categorical terms that the right of speedy and public trial is as much a constitutional right in India under Article 21 as it is in America under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, yet here its content or effect would be in a way different or lesser. That no qualification or precondition has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court whilst unreservedly importing the Sixth Amendment within the sweep of Article 21 seems manifest. On the doctrine of binding precedent, therefore, it must be held that the basic human right of speedy trial is virtually written with pen and ink into the constitutional right relating to the right to life and liberty guaranteed by our Article 21.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 94 - O C Reddy - Full Document
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