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1 - 10 of 23 (0.42 seconds)Section 4 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 6 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Munshi Singh & Others Etc. Etc vs Union Of India Etc. Etc on 23 August, 1972
In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat's case, this Court
referred to the judgments in Munshi Singh v.
Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337, State of
Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471,
Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4
SCC 255, Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004)
8 SCC 14, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627,
Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 553
and observed:
State Of Punjab vs Gurdial Singh & Ors on 25 October, 1979
In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat's case, this Court
referred to the judgments in Munshi Singh v.
Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337, State of
Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471,
Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4
SCC 255, Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004)
8 SCC 14, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627,
Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 553
and observed:
Section 17 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
M/S Kamal Trading P.Ltd vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 13 December, 2011
In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal (supra), this Court again considered the
scope of Section 5-A and observed:
Women Education Trust And Another vs State Of Haryana And Another on 28 January, 2011
24) The aforesaid dicta was reiterated recently in Women's
Education Trust and another v. State of Haryana and others5
emphasising the importance of Section 5-A in the following words:
Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Etc vs Mohd. Shafi And Ors. Etc on 13 February, 1992
28) This brings us to the validity of second notification. As already
mentioned above, 55.41 acres of land has been acquired vide
notification No.3 dated 07.08.2010 and the public purpose stated
is “Development of Urban Estate, mainly to adjust oustees of
Missing Link-II (Dhandra Road to Sidhwan Canal via Malerkotla
Civil Appeal Nos. 3177-3178 of 2015 & Ors. Page 31 of 41
(arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 26770-26771 of 2011 & Ors.)
Road, Ludhiana)”. The main plank of attack of the appellants to
this notification is that land of the appellants could not be
acquired to rehabilitate other persons, and in the process
rendering the appellants homeless and landless. Such an action
was arbitrary and illegal which also amounted to depriving the
appellants of their livelihood. It was also argued that in the
process, the changes which made were much more serious
violating the master plan. It was also argued that the aforesaid
stated purpose is totally vague, since it only says that the same is
for the development of a residential urban estate. It was argued
that the public purpose of “residential” has been held by this
Court to be vague in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd.
Shafi6:
Delhi Administration vs Gurdip Singh Uban And Ors. Etc on 18 August, 2000
In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat's case, this Court
referred to the judgments in Munshi Singh v.
Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337, State of
Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471,
Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4
SCC 255, Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004)
8 SCC 14, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627,
Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 553
and observed: