Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 12 (0.25 seconds)
Gulamminya Hasuminya Deceased Through ... vs Sakhavatkhan Mohmadkhan Deceased ... on 1 October, 2000
cites
Section 116 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 12 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Section 116 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 9 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Kumar Raj Krishna Prosad Lal Singh Deo vs Barabani Coal Concern Ltd. And Ors. on 20 July, 1934
In support of his arguments, he has cited one authority of KUMAR KRISHNA PROSAD LAL SINGHA DEO VS. BARABONI COAL CONCERN, LTD. AND OTHERS, reported in A.I.R. 1937 Privy Council P. 251, wherein it has been held that the tenant is not precluded from denying the derivative title of the persons claiming through the landlord. Shri Shah has argued that here in this case, plaintiff has come with a case that he derived title in the property by purchasing suit property from original owners i.e. original lessors of the present defendant being lessee.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
D. Satyanarayana vs P. Jagadish on 15 September, 1987
He has also cited one another authority of D.SATYANARAYANA Vs. P. JAGADISH reported AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT, P. 2192, wherein it has been held that-
C.Chandramohan vs Sengottaiyan (Dead) By Lrs & Ors on 4 January, 2000
In aforesaid case of C. Chandramohan (supra), there was a lake of knowledge of the release deed on the part of defendants, and therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the case of the defendants that appellant has failed to make out a case of denial of title of the premises by respondents. It may be noted that here in this case, plaintiff addressed a notice Ex.31 dt. 22/9/1977 to defendant and informed him about suit property purchased by him by sale deed from original owners. In Para 3 to reply of defendant to the notice (Ex.38) dt. 19/10/1977, defendant has not denied that title of the plaintiff in the suit property, but he has stated that he has no knowledge as to since when plaintiff has become an owner. For this he has assigned reason that original owners have not given a notice of attornment to him. On reading that reply to notice Ex.38, from the language and tenure of the reply, it can be said that defendant has advanced his case only for failure of giving attornment notice to him by the original owners. He has not denied title of the plaintiff in the suit property. This reply Ex.38 should not be read in piecemeal but it should be read as a whole and on reading all the contents of reply Ex.38, we find that it is the case of defendant that plaintiff cannot become an owner of suit property as sale deed is void. Thus, on reading Ex.38, it clearly appears that he has not denied title of the plaintiff which he derived from the original owner by the sale deed. The only contention taken by defendant is with regard to failure of giving notice of attornment to him by original owners and nature of sale deed which is registered one is a void agreement. In view of what is deposed to by defendant in his evidence, and on reading his written reply Ex.38, it is certain that defendant has not denied the title of the plaintiff in the suit property. For the first time, when defendant filed his written statement on or about 2nd May, 1978, he denied that plaintiff is not a legal owner of the suit property. This Court is of the view that considering the conduct of the defendant that for the first time when he replied the notice of the plaintiff, he did not deny the title of plaintiff but he denied only date of purchase and challenged legality of sale deed. Till then, there was no dispute for title of the plaintiff in the suit property from the side of the defendant, and therefore, this Court is of the view that when defendant replied notice Ex.31 dt. 22/9/1977 by his reply Ex.38 dt. 19/10/1977, he accepted the plaintiff as an owner of the property. But subsequent act of defendant denying the title of plaintiff in written statement Ex.13 attracts the provisions of Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act. His contention with regard to denial of title is not bonafide contention. He has admitted in his evidence that in fact he wanted to purchase the suit property, but as the plaintiff purchased the suit property, he would not have paid the rent, if the plaintiff would come to him to collect the rent.