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M. K. Ranganathan And Another vs Government Of Madras And Others on 20 April, 1955 cites

The Governor General In Council vs Shiromani Sugar Mills Limited (In ... on 11 March, 1946

The Federal Court also put a similar construction on the provisions of section 171 read with section 232(1) of the Act in The Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation)(1) "Section 171 must, in our judgment, be construed with reference to other sections of the Act and the general scheme of administration of the assets of a company in liquidation laid down by the Act. In particular, we would refer to section 232. Section 232 appears to us to be supplementary to section 171 by providing that any creditor (other than Government) who goes ahead, notwithstanding a winding-up order or in ignorance of it, with any attachment, distress, execution or sale, without the previous leave of the Court, will find that such steps are void. The ref- erence to "distress" indicates that leave of the Court is required for more than the initiation of original proceedings in the nature of a suit in an ordinary Court of law.
Bombay High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 91 - Full Document

Vasudeva Mudaliar vs K.S. Srinivasa Pillai on 22 July, 1907

If the construction sought to be put upon the words "or any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties" by the Appellants were accepted it would effect a fundamental alteration in the law as it stood before the amendment was inserted in section 232(1) by Act XXII of 1936. Whereas before the amendment the secured creditor stood outside the winding up and could if the mortgage deed so provided, realise his security without the intervention of the Court by effecting a sale either by private treaty or by public auction, no such sale could be effected by him after the amendment and that was certainly a fundamental alteration in the law which could not be effected unless one found words used which pointed unmistakably to that conclusion or unless such intention was expressed with irresistible clearness. Having regard to the circumstances under which the amendment was inserted in section 232(1) by Act XXII of 1936 and also having regard to the context we are not prepared to hold that the Legislature in inserting that amendment intended to effect a fundamental alteration in law with irresistible clearness. Such a great and sudden change of policy could not be attributed to the Legislature and it would be legitimate therefore to adopt the narrower interpretation of those words of the amendment rather than an interpretation which would have the contrary effect. (Vide the observations of the Privy Council in Vasudeva Mudaliar & Others v. Srinivasa Pillai & another(1). (1) [1855] 20 Beav. 269.
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 46 - Full Document
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