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1 - 10 of 17 (1.20 seconds)Section 228A in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
Section 228 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 4 in The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [Entire Act]
Section 376 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 120B in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Amit Kapoor vs Ramesh Chander & Anr on 13 September, 2012
22. Also, in the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in
(2012) 9 SCC 460, it has been categorically laid down by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court that if it appears to the Court that there is a ground for
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presuming that the accused has committed an offence and the facts and
ingredients of the Section exists for an offence, then it would proceed
against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. It is also evident that
at the initial stage during framing of charge, if there exits strong suspicion
by the Court that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open
to the Court to neglect the facts and material available on record and say
that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
State Of Bihar vs Ramesh Singh on 2 August, 1977
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is
concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused
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has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty.
All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts
would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The
final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the
well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh
Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] : (SCC pp. 41-42,
para 4)
―4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the
prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the
accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of
the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court
to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order
either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ‗the Judge
considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ‗the Judge is
of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence which-- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the
court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as
provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in
juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the
beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect
of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be
meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable
defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage
of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance
whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence
of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be
finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or
otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of
deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At
that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his
conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains
in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at
the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong
suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not
open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the
accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of
the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the
accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it
is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court
should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if
fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted
by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for
proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to
indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither
possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law
by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial,
then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his
acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of
making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a
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situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be
made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.‖