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Vodafone Idea Limited, Bhubaneswar vs Acit, Tds, Bhubaneswar on 5 June, 2020 cites

C.I.T.,Delhi vs M/S.Bharti Cellular Ltd on 12 August, 2010

23. Similar, with regards to provisions of section 194J of the Act in respect of roaming charges, we find that this issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Bharti Cellular Ltd (supra) and respectfully following the same, we hold that the assessee is not required to deduct tax u/s.194J of the Act and consequently, the assessee shall not be treated as an assessee in default u/s 201(1) of the Act. Once, the assessee is treated as assessee not in default u/s.201(1), the interest u/s.201(1A) is not required to be charged. We, accordingly, allow the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 181 - S H Kapadia - Full Document

Income Tax Officer,Udaipur vs M/S Arihant Tiles & Marbles(P)Ltd on 2 December, 2009

Ld D.R. also relied on the decision of ITAT Chennai Bench 'A ' in the case of ITO vs P a g e 9 | 26 ITA No s. 306 t o 3 09 /C TK/ 201 9 Assessm ent Y ears : 20 09- 201 0 to 20 12- 13 Vodafone Essar Cellular Ltd(2011) 12 taxmann.com 45 (Chennai), wherein, it was held that the discount given was nothing but commission within the meaning of explanation (i) of Section 194H on which tax was deducible and since the assessee did not deduct tax under section 194H of the Act, the assessee was held defaulter within the meaning of section 201(1) of the Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 119 - S H Kapadia - Full Document

M/S Bharti Airtel Limited, Chandigarh vs Acit (Tds), Chandigarh on 30 May, 2018

In view of above, respectfully following the decision of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court and Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Bharati Airtel Ltd (supra), we hold that the assessee is not required to deduct tax under section 194H of the Act on the prepaid SIM Cards and hence, the assessee is not in default as per provisions of section 201(1) of the Act.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Chandigarh Cites 12 - Cited by 29 - Full Document

Otters Club, Mumbai vs Dit (E), Mumbai on 15 June, 2018

10. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice P a g e 24 | 26 ITA No s. 306 t o 3 09 /C TK/ 201 9 Assessm ent Y ears : 20 09- 201 0 to 20 12- 13 delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while calculating the time for disposal of matters made time- bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. "
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 5 - Cited by 152 - Full Document
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