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1 - 10 of 23 (4.60 seconds)Section 439 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 441 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 437 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Raj Kumar @ Raj Kumar Yadav @ Sadhu Prasad vs State Of Bihar on 1 October, 2010
The view
taken in Salauddin‟s case has been followed in all
these cases, with certain observations/modifications
but so far the view taken by the learned single
Judge in the case of Anirudh Pd. alias Sadhu
Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2006(2) PLJR
676 is concerned, a different view has been taken.
Bharat Chaudhary & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Anr on 8 October, 2003
I have already referred to the case of Bharat
Chaudhary(supra) and I have already held that it
never fell for consideration by the Apex Court in
that case as to whether an accused who had been
admitted to anticipatory bail till submission of the
charge sheet could prefer yet another anticipatory
bail petition after submission of the charge sheet
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and passing of cognizance order.
Mahendra Prasad Singh & Ors vs The State Of Bihar & Ors on 7 November, 2009
In case these petitioners will surrender and file their
applications for bail under Section 439 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, the concerned Court will
pass an order in the similar manner as has been
decided in the case of Mahendra Prasad Singh vs.
State of Bihar reported in 2004(3) PLJR 491.
Jagnarayan Yadav @ Babajee Yadav & Ors vs The State Of Bihar on 18 March, 2010
35. From the discussions of the relevant
law set down by the Supreme Court, it is
abundantly clear that an order of anticipatory bail
may also be only for a limited period of time or till a
particular stage of investigation of the case, like, till
submission of the charge sheet or passing of order
of cognizance in a case and it may not be bad if the
accused was directed to surrender and pray for
regular bail thereafter before the original courts of
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competent jurisdiction. The above view appears
taken by three of the decisions of this Court cited
by the learned Single Judge in his order of
reference which are reported in 2004(3)
P.L.J.R.491 Mahendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of
Bihar, 2007(4) B.B.C.J. V-66 Sheochandra Singh
and Ors. Vs.State and 2010(2) P.L.J.R. 684
Jagnarayan Yadav alias Babajee Yadav & Ors. Vs.
The State of Bihar. However, what I find is that
except the proposition that such accused persons
could not file another anticipatory bail petition and
the same could not be maintainable, no further and
definite reason has been assigned by any of the
decisions including those of the Apex Court in
support of the above as regards explaining the
scope, ambit and application ofthe provision of
Section 438 Cr. P.C. I, in fact, find that there could
be some very good reason flowing from the
provision and scheme of the Cr. P.C. itself in the
above behalf which gets clear support from the
prevailing practice on the provisions regarding bail.
In my considered view, the reason for not
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maintaining the anticipatory bail petition again by
such accused persons could be deduced from
some of the provisions in the same Chapter XXXIII
of the Cr.P.C
L.K. Verma vs H.M.T. Ltd. & Anr on 31 January, 2006
Reference in the above behalf was made to
the decision in Niranjan Singh and another Vs.
Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and others reported in
A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 785 in which the Apex Court
adumbrated upon the word „custody‟ and it was
held that direction issued in K.L.Verma (Supra)
was per incuriam.