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Munni Devi vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 13 December, 2011 cites

N.Nagendra Rao & Co vs State Of A.P on 6 September, 1994

In N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P.17 it was observed: (SCC p. 235, para 25) "25. But there the immunity ends. No civilised system can permit an executive to play with the people of its country and claim that it is entitled to act in any manner as it is sovereign. The concept of public interest has changed with structural change in the society. No legal or political system today can place the State above law as it is unjust and unfair for a citizen to be deprived of his property illegally by negligent act of officers of the State without any remedy. From sincerity, efficiency and dignity of State as a juristic person, propounded in nineteenth century as sound sociological basis for State immunity the circle has gone round and the emphasis now is more on liberty, equality and the rule of law. The modern social thinking of progressive societies and the judicial approach is to do away with archaic State protection and place the State or the Government on a par with any other juristic legal entity. Any watertight compartmentalisation of the functions of the State as „sovereign and non-sovereign‟ or „governmental and non-governmental‟ is not sound. It is contrary to modern jurisprudential thinking. The need of the State to have extraordinary powers cannot be doubted. But with the conceptual change of statutory power being statutory duty for sake of society and the people the claim of a common man or ordinary citizen cannot be thrown out merely because it was done by an officer of the State even though it was against law and negligent. Needs of the State, duty of its officials and right of the citizens are required to be reconciled so that the rule of law in a welfare State is not shaken. Even in America where this doctrine of sovereignty found its place either because of the „financial instability of the infant American States rather than to the stability of the doctrine's theoretical foundation‟, or because 10 of „logical and practical ground‟, or that „there could be no legal right as against the State which made the law‟ gradually gave way to the movement from, „State irresponsibility to State responsibility‟. In welfare State, functions of the State are not only defence of the country or administration of justice or maintaining law and order but it extends to regulating and controlling the activities of people in almost every sphere, educational, commercial, social, economic, political and even marital. The demarcating line between sovereign and non- sovereign powers for which no rational basis survives has largely disappeared. Therefore, barring functions such as administration of justice, maintenance of law and order and repression of crime etc. which are among the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional Government, the State cannot claim any immunity."
Supreme Court of India Cites 32 - Cited by 226 - R M Sahai - Full Document

Common Cause, A Registered Society vs Union Of India & Ors on 3 August, 1999

30. The whole question was again examined by this Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India18 in which the entire history relating to the institution of suits by or against the State or, to be precise, against the Government of India, beginning from the time of the East India Company right up to the stage of the Constitution, was considered and the theory of immunity was rejected. In this process of judicial advancement, Kasturi Lal case9 has paled into insignificance and is no longer of any binding value.
Supreme Court of India Cites 105 - Cited by 756 - S S Ahmad - Full Document

Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory Of ... on 13 January, 1981

In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi14 the Court held that right to life means the right to live with basic human dignity. In this case, the petitioner, who was a British national and was detained in Central Jail, Tihar, had approached this Court through a petition of habeas corpus in which it was stated that she experienced considerable difficulty in having interview with her lawyer and the members of her family. She stated that her daughter, who was 5 years of age, and her sister who was looking after the daughter, were permitted to have interview with her only once in a month. Considering the petition, Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) observed at AIR pp. 753-54 in para 8 as under: (SCC pp. 619-20, para 9) "9. The same consequence would follow even if this problem is considered from the point of view of the right to personal liberty enshrined in Article 21, for the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is clearly part of personal liberty guaranteed under that article. The expression „personal liberty‟ occurring in Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal interpretation in Maneka Gandhi case10 and it has been held in that case that the expression „personal liberty‟ used in that article is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of a man and it also includes rights which „have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional 9 protection under Article 19‟. There can therefore be no doubt that „personal liberty‟ would include the right to socialise with members of the family and friends subject, of course, to any valid prison regulations and under Articles 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by it regulating the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is arbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid as being violative of Articles 14 and 21."
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 341 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document
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