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1 - 10 of 11 (0.48 seconds)The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850
Tarlok Nath vs Union Territory Of Chandigarh And ... on 12 March, 2010
36. These infirmities lethally imperil the proceedings, resulting in
the passing of the impugned order dated 5th May, 2003, in view of the
law laid down by the two Constitution Bench judgments of the
Supreme Court in Tirlok Nath (supra) and T. R. Varma (supra).
Prejudice, to the petitioner, is writ large in both the above decisions of
the IO, i.e., firstly, the decision not to allow inspection, to the DA,
who was appearing on behalf of the petitioner for the first time, an
opportunity to examine and inspect the relevant records of the case, as
sought in his letter dated 21st February, 2003, and, secondly, the
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 45 of 48
decision to rely on the depositions of Prof. J. P. Gupta and of the AR
(S & P), as recorded in the Daily Order Sheet dated 24th February,
2003, without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine
the said deponents who, effectively, were being treated as witnesses in
favour of the NSIT.
State Bank Of Patiala & Ors vs S.K.Sharma on 27 March, 1996
24. Of the various submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, I deem it appropriate to dispose of certain contentions at
the outset. While doing so, I have borne, in mind, the principle,
enunciated in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364 (which digested several earlier authorities on the issue) and
followed, thereafter, in a host of decisions, including State of T. N. v.
Thiru K. V. Perumal, (1996) 5 SCC 474, State of U. P. v. Harendra
Arora, (2001) 6 SCC 392 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor
Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, that mere violation of a procedural
requirement, while conducting the inquiry, or while passing the order
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 36 of 48
on the conclusion thereof, would not vitiate the disciplinary
proceedings, unless and until the charged officer is able to establish
the existence of prejudice, having resulted as a consequence of such
violation. Wade, in his classic treatise on Administrative Law,
expresses the same principle in the following words:
Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Ors on 2 April, 1970
16. The petitioner has, in rejoinder to the counter-affidavit filed by
Respondent Nos. 2 and 4, relied on the decision of the Hon‟ble
Lieutenant Governor, as appellate authority, passed in the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against Ms. Nirmal Oberoi, UDC, reducing the
penalty, awarded to her, from removal from service to reduction in
rank from Grade III to Grade IV. The petitioner pleaded
discrimination, vis-à-vis Ms. Nirmal Oberoi, in the matter of awarding
of punishment. The petitioner has reiterated his submission that the
impugned order, having been taken by the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4,
instead of the BOG, stands vitiated even on that score, and has relied,
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 23 of 48
for the said purpose, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Mahabir Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 SC 1302. Apropos the
submission, of Respondent Nos.
State Of U.P vs Harendra Arora & Anr on 2 May, 2001
24. Of the various submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, I deem it appropriate to dispose of certain contentions at
the outset. While doing so, I have borne, in mind, the principle,
enunciated in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364 (which digested several earlier authorities on the issue) and
followed, thereafter, in a host of decisions, including State of T. N. v.
Thiru K. V. Perumal, (1996) 5 SCC 474, State of U. P. v. Harendra
Arora, (2001) 6 SCC 392 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor
Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, that mere violation of a procedural
requirement, while conducting the inquiry, or while passing the order
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 36 of 48
on the conclusion thereof, would not vitiate the disciplinary
proceedings, unless and until the charged officer is able to establish
the existence of prejudice, having resulted as a consequence of such
violation. Wade, in his classic treatise on Administrative Law,
expresses the same principle in the following words:
Aligarh Muslim University And Ors vs Mansoor Ali Khan on 28 August, 2000
24. Of the various submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, I deem it appropriate to dispose of certain contentions at
the outset. While doing so, I have borne, in mind, the principle,
enunciated in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364 (which digested several earlier authorities on the issue) and
followed, thereafter, in a host of decisions, including State of T. N. v.
Thiru K. V. Perumal, (1996) 5 SCC 474, State of U. P. v. Harendra
Arora, (2001) 6 SCC 392 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor
Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, that mere violation of a procedural
requirement, while conducting the inquiry, or while passing the order
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 36 of 48
on the conclusion thereof, would not vitiate the disciplinary
proceedings, unless and until the charged officer is able to establish
the existence of prejudice, having resulted as a consequence of such
violation. Wade, in his classic treatise on Administrative Law,
expresses the same principle in the following words:
State Of Tamil Nadu vs Thiru K.V.Perumal & Ors on 16 July, 1996
24. Of the various submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, I deem it appropriate to dispose of certain contentions at
the outset. While doing so, I have borne, in mind, the principle,
enunciated in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364 (which digested several earlier authorities on the issue) and
followed, thereafter, in a host of decisions, including State of T. N. v.
Thiru K. V. Perumal, (1996) 5 SCC 474, State of U. P. v. Harendra
Arora, (2001) 6 SCC 392 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor
Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, that mere violation of a procedural
requirement, while conducting the inquiry, or while passing the order
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 36 of 48
on the conclusion thereof, would not vitiate the disciplinary
proceedings, unless and until the charged officer is able to establish
the existence of prejudice, having resulted as a consequence of such
violation. Wade, in his classic treatise on Administrative Law,
expresses the same principle in the following words:
Syed Yakoob vs K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others on 7 October, 1963
21. While exercising the power of judicial review, over the order
passed by the disciplinary, or the appellant, authority, consequent to
departmental proceedings against an allegedly delinquent employee,
the Court, acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does
not sit as a court of appeal. The jurisdiction exercised by the Court is
strictly one of judicial review, which is concerned more with the
W.P. (C) 3239/2003 Page 32 of 48
manner in which jurisdiction has been exercised by the authority
below, rather than the merits of the findings of such authority. The
jurisdiction exercised by this court is in the realm of certiorari,
regarding which the following observations, by the Supreme Court in
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 are, by now,
regarded as locus classicus: