Sunkuru Suryanarayana Alias ... vs Sunkuru Ramadoss And Ors. on 29 August, 1917
7. Then we pass on to the question whether a sapinda's consent is revocable and if so, whether the revocation here is valid. As the lower Court points out, the first defendant in revoking his consent acted arbitrarily. As already mentioned, he gave his consent on the 26th January, 1933; in his written statement, filed on the 23rd March, there is a re-affirmation by him of his previous consent, which he wishes should remain in force. But within a few months, he changed his mind and purported to cancel it, but had the honesty to admit in the witness-box that his revocation was due to "family misunderstandings", though he would add that he would prefer a Bokkali boy. On this evidence the learned Judge's conclusion that the revocation was arbitrary, is perfectly justified. As Seshagiri Aiyar, J., points out in Suryanarayana v. Ramadoss (1917) 34 M.L.J. 87 : I.L.R. 41 Mad. 604 the assent of a sapinda is presumptive evidence of the bona fides to the widow's act. That being of the essence of the doctrine of consent, it is impossible to uphold the contention that a sapinda may at his pleasure withdraw his consent. It has been faintly argued that the discretion in the exercise of which a sapinda gives his consent, necessarily carries with it a power to revoke it. This is contrary to the spirit of the Hindu Law, which treats a sapinda's consent as amounting to an expression of his opinion that the adoption conduces to the spiritual benefit of the deceased person. We without hesitation concur in the view of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., when a sapinda upon a dispassionate consideration of the question once gives his consent, he cannot arbitrarily or capriciously withdraw it. Whether he can do so for justifiable reasons, is a matter we need not go into, for, in the present case, there is not a shadow of justification for suggesting that such reasons exist.