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1 - 10 of 13 (1.60 seconds)Article 44 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 21 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 8 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Minor C.R. Ramaswami Aiyangar, ... vs C.S. Rangachariar And Ors. on 6 October, 1939
The basic decision which throws considerable light on the controversy highlighted by me now Is the one reported in Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Rangachariar, 1940-1 Mad LJ 32 = (AIR 1940 Mad 113) where Leach. C. J., discussed these precise problems and held that such transactions in excess of the limited authority of the manager or guardian or widow did not require to be cancelled or set aside through court. In cases where minors are involved, the property may
be owned by the joint family and although a junior member's presence or junction may be unnecessary, he may be joined in the transaction and got represented by the Kartha or some other person as his guardian. It may also be that where the property belongs to the minor and not to a joint family, a guardian may act on his behalf and that way it may be stated that the minor is eo nomine a party to the transaction. Leach, C. J., took the view that where decrees have been passed in suits to which junior members or guardians have been made eo nomine a party, "such decrees bind him until set aside, and therefore he cannot seek to obtain a decision on the footing that his interest in the joint family property is not affected by them". However, where transactions had not ripened into decrees, the learned Judge held that there was a substantial difference in the substantive law. His Lordship continued to deal with it and observed:
Section 3 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Article 144 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Unni And Anr. vs Kunchi Amma And Ors. on 26 August, 1890
"The other transactions of the first defendant, whether the plaintiff is made a party thereto or not, stand on a different footing. He is not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue for a declaration or cancellation In respect of any of them. The legal position has been correctly explained in Unni v. Kunchi Amma, ( (1890) ILR 14 Mad 26 at 28), in the following words which were taken from an unreported decision of this Court :--
Bijoy Gopal Mukerji vs Srimati Krishna Mahishi on 7 February, 1907
'If a person not having authority to execute a deed, or having such authority under certain circumstances which did not exist, executes a deed, it is not necessary for persons who are not bound by it to sue to set it aside, for it cannot be used against them. They may treat it as non-existent and sue for their right as if it did not exist.'
The same principle has been distinctly laid down by the Privy Council in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi, (1907) 17 Mad LJ 154 where their Lordships point eut the jural basis underlying such transactions. In that case the reversioner sued for a declaration that a lease granted by the widow of the last male owner was not binding on him and for khas possession. It was objected that the omission to set aside the lease by a suit instituted within the time limited by Article 91 of the Indian Limitation Act was fatal to the suit. The following observations which are equally applicable to a father or manager of a joint family are apposite:--