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1 - 10 of 14 (1.42 seconds)Section 299 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Virsa Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 11 March, 1958
Stabbing on the neck is intentional and on applying the principles laid down in the case of Virsa Singh (supra), it is clear that this is a case where the prosecution has proved its case within Clause 3rdly of Section 300 of IPC.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 304 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 161 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
State Of Rajasthan vs Dhool Singh on 18 December, 2003
In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh question of intention to cause injury likely to cause death was considered. In this case injured had suffered incised injury used by sword. Injury was caused on the left side of the neck cutting thyroid cartilage transversally on left side sternoclinoid muscle. External jugular vein, internal jugular vein and common carotid artery were cut completely. Doctor opined in this case that cause of death was due to cut on the neck and the excess bleeding and heart failure. It is held in Paragraph 12 of the judgment that it is clear that the opinion of the doctor as to cause of death was the incised cut wound on the neck which led to excessive bleeding and heart failure. It is further observed by the Apex Court that the High Court's observation that there is no opinion of the doctor in regard to the cause of death is contrary to medical evidence. While considering the scope of Section 300 of IPC, it is held that culpable homicide becomes murder if the attacker causes the injury which he knows is likely to cause death of the victim or in consequence to such injury victim dies. Once these ingredients are established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, then conviction under Section 302, IPC should be maintained. If medical evidence is silent about nature of injury caused by the appellant and where there is no material to assess the nature of injury, then the Court has drawn a conclusion that the case would fall under Section 326, IPC, but where the Court has come to a definite conclusion about the nature of injury, which could be seen from the record, the intention and knowledge of the accused becomes clear. It is further held in this case that the Trial Court has rightly convicted the accused under Section 302, IPC and the High Court on erroneous appreciation of evidence has converted the offence into one under Section 304, Part II of IPC. It is further observed in this case that the Courts should bear in mind that there is a requirement in law that every conviction should be followed by an appropriate sentence within the period stipulated in law. Discretion in this regard is not absolute or whimsical. It is controlled by law and to some extent by judicial discretion, applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, there is a need for the Courts to apply its mind while imposing sentence. In the instant case, the Court while convicting the respondent for an offence punishable under Section 304, Part 11 of 1PC which has maximum sentence up to 10 years thought it fit to impose the sentence already undergone without even applying its mind as to why it should be less than 10 years or for that matter what is the sentence already undergone.
Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed And Ors vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 27 August, 2002
In the case of Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P. the intention of accused prevailing at the time of assault was considered. It is held by the Apex Court that the intention of accused prevailing at the time of assault determines the applicability of the relevant provisions of IPC. While considering Section 299 and Section 300 of IPC, culpable homicide and murder and its distinction, it is held in this case that Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds to Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that "intention to cause death" is not an essential requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of Clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person.