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1 - 10 of 10 (0.24 seconds)Section 91 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Sait Bolumal Dharmdas Firm, Bankers ... vs Gollapudi Venkatachelapathi Rao And ... on 28 January, 1959
In Firm Bolumal v. Venkatachalapathi Rao , which considered the scope of Section 92 and the 6th proviso the facts were these : The plaintiff filed , a suit on a promissory note executed by the defendants for a sum of Rs. 1,400. The defence was that the second defendant obtained a charge decree for Rs. 2,000 against a third party and that decree was transferred to the plaintiff under a document for a sum of Rs. 600. It was his further case that at the time of assignment of this decree, the understanding between the plaintiff and the second defendant was that the assignment should serve as a security for the monies to be advanced by the plaintiff to the second defendant in future. The decree was executed by the plaintiff and in the execution proceedings the property. was brought to sale and purchased by the second defendant for a sum of Rs. 1,400. The amount of Rs. 1,400 was deposited by the plaintiff for the second defendant and later withdrawn by him as assignee decree-holder. For this, before the deposit of the money, he got a promisory note for Rs. 1,400 executed by the second defendant. With respect to the plea of the second defendant, the plaintiff contended that it was not open to the second defendant to plead contrary to the terms of the assignment of the decree itself and that the assignment was as security for the amounts to be lent in future, while considering this question, with reference to the sixth proviso, the Division Bench held :
Ram Narayan Pandey And Ors. vs Kedar Nath Tewari And Ors. on 30 January, 1965
16. That was a case where the suit was filed for the recovery of an amount due on a bond executed by the first defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the first and the second defendants were partners and that the money was borrowed for the partnership and for partnership purposes. The Courts below held that since the bond was executed only by the first defendant it was not open to the plaintiff to let in oral evidence to show that the second defendants also was liable on the bond. Though he was not eo nominee a party to the instrument, a Division Bench of this Court held that there is nothing in Section 91 or Section 92 of the Evidence Act which prohibits such a plea. It was held further that a question as to who the contracting parties are was not one of the "terms of the contract'' within the meaning of Section 92 and that therefore it is open to the plaintiff to let in evidence to show that the second defendant was also liable under the bond. This decision was followed by the Patna High Court in Ram Narayan v. Kedar Nath . In that case also it was held that the reference to the terms of the contract in sections 91 and 92 does not extend to the parties to the contract. What is excluded by Section 92 is the oral evidence designed to contradict, vary, add to or substract from the terms agreed upon by the parties and not as to who the real contracting parties were. Section 92 itself recognised the distinction between a term of the contract and the contracting parties.
R. Viswanathan vs Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid on 4 May, 1962
13. The Supreme Court also in Viswanathan v. Abdul Wajid , has held that the admissibility of evidence to contradict the recitals in the document was not precluded by Section 92 " as the dispute in the suit did not arise between the parties to the document but between persons who claimed under the executants of the documents", thereby suggesting that the words parties to the document in Section 92 do not refer to a case where they fulfil the same characteras purchaser or vendor, donor or donee. These decisions have been cited in some of the text books on the law of evidence without any comment. (Vide Field on Law of Evidence, 10th Edition, Volume IV, page 3702 and Sarkar on Evidence; 12th Edition pages 776 and 777).
C. Venkatasubbiah Chetty vs T. Govindarajulu Naidu on 29 November, 1907
15. The same result could also be reached from another angle. What Section 92 prohibits is letting in evidence to contradict, vary or subtract from the terms of the instrument. The parties to a document are not and could not be considered to be a term of the instrument itself. In other words, it is open to a person to show who the real party to a document is and in what character and for what purpose a particular person was impleaded as a party to the document. That evidence will not in any way be considered as having relevance to the terms of the document itself. This was also the view taken in Venkatasubbiah Chetty v. Govindarajulu Naidu ((sic)) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 45 18 M.L.J. 1.
Section 94 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 95 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Sait Balumal Dharmdas Firm Bankers vs Gollapudi Venkata Chelapathi Rao And ... on 7 May, 1954
2. The defendant-respondent borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,000 from the plaintiff-appellant and adding another sum of Rs. 3,000 of his own, he purchased the suit property under the original of Exhibit A-1, dated 22nd October, 1960 but the purchasers were shown as the plaintiff and defendant. It was the case of the defendant that as security for the loan of Rs. 3,000, the plaintiff's name was also shown as a purchaser under the document but no title was intended to be conferred on the plaintiff or was in fact conferred. The plaintiff filed the suit for partition and separate possession of his one-half share alleging that he was a real purchaser having contributed Rs. 3,000 towards the sale consideration and that the plea raised in defence is barred under Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Both the Courts below have held that the borrowing was true and that the defendant had also not discharged the debt. The Courts below also held, relying on the decision reported in Salt Balumal Dharamdas Firm v. Venkata Chalapathi Rao and certain observations in Rakkiayappa Goundar v. Ghinnu Goundan that the defendant was not barred under Section 92 of the Evidence Act from pleading that no title passed to the plaintiff under the original of Exhibit A-1.
Muhammad Sultan Mohideen Ahmed Ansari ... vs Amathul Jalal Alias Achi Bibi Saheba on 1 December, 1926
12. This decision was followed expressly in Muhammad Sultan Mohideen Ahmed Ansari v. Amathul Jalal 101 I.C. 653 : (1927) 53 M.L.J. 557 : A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1102 (2), by Devadoss, J. That was a case where a Hindu father executed a sale deed in favour of his two sons. Originally when the sale deed was drafted and presented before the Sub-Registrar, the document showed that one brother has to take the A Schedule properties and the other the B Schedule properties. But there was the objection of the Sub-Registrar that either there should be two sale deeds separately in favour of the sons with respect to the separate properties or the entire properties should be conveyed to both the brothers jointly. On that objection of the Sub-Registrar, he struck off that portion in the document which referred to and allowed A Schedule properties to one and the B Schedule properties to the other and had the document registered. Subsequently the pattas and other records were transferred in the name of the plaintiff in respect of the A Schedule properties and in the name of the defendant in respect of the B Schedule properties. The plaintiff contended that since the sale deed was taken in the joint names of both the plaintiff and the defendant each of them was entitled to a moiety of the whole property and no evidence could be adduced to show what the father intended that each should take. Overruling this objection, this Court held that Section 92 is not applicable to a case were the parties stand in the same character as donees.
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