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Reserve Bank Of India vs Peerless General Finance & Investment ... on 22 January, 1987

(See Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu AIR 1980 SC 150; Reserve Bank of India v. Pearless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. AIR 1987 SC 1023 and Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 335). The inclusive definition of "district judge" in Article 236(a) of the Constitution has been very widely construed to include hierarchy of specialized Civil Courts viz. Labour Courts and Industrial Courts which are not expressly included in the definition.
Supreme Court of India Cites 31 - Cited by 517 - O C Reddy - Full Document

The State Of Maharashtra vs Labour Law Practitioners' Association ... on 11 February, 1998

(See State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association AIR 1998 SC 1233). Therefore, there is no warrant or justification for restricting the applicability of the Act to residential buildings alone merely on the ground that in the opening part of the definition of the word "premises", the words "building or hut" have been used.
Supreme Court of India Cites 30 - Cited by 79 - S V Manohar - Full Document

Blue Print & 13 Ors. vs Blue Great Eastern Hotels Authority & ... on 14 October, 1999

12. Learned counsel for the appellant has next submitted that in Blue Print & 13 Ors. v. The Great Eastern Hotels Authority & Ors. (2000) 1 Calcutta Law Times 450, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had held that the Act applied only to residential premises and, therefore, it was not open to learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench in the appeal filed by the appellant to take a contrary view, namely, that the Act is applicable to residential as well as non-residential premises including industrial sheds. It is necessary to state here that the decision in the case of Blue Print & 13 others was challenged by the State of West Bengal by filing an appeal in this Court and the judgment is reported in (2002) 4 SCC 134 (State of West Bengal & ors. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr.). Though the appeal was dismissed but the question as to whether the Act would apply only to residential premises was not decided and was left open, as will be evident from para 23 of the reports. As we have examined the controversy and have come to the conclusion that the Act is applicable to non-residential and commercial premises as well, the contention raised is purely academic in nature and can have no bearing on the fate of the appeal.
Calcutta High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Angurbala Mullick vs Debabrata Mullick on 3 May, 1951

10. As the language shows, the definition of the word "premises" as given in Section 2(c) of the Act is a very comprehensive one and it not only means any building or hut or part of a building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately but also includes godowns, gardens and out-houses appurtenant thereto and also any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixed for the use of the tenant in such building, hut or seat in a room, as the case may be. A "seat in a room" or "gardens" or "godowns" by themselves do not qualify to be called a residential building. A residence ordinarily means  a place where one resides; the act or fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for some time; an act of making one's home in a place. "Residential" ordinarily means - used, serving or designed as a residence or for occupation by residents; relating to or connected with residence. Gardens or grounds or any furniture supplied or fittings or fixtures affixed in a building or seat in a room can by no stretch of imagination be called or said to be a residential building, but they are included in the definition of premises. This shows that the legislature intended to give a very wide and all comprehensive definition of premises and did not intend to give it a restricted meaning. The opening part of the definition of the word "premises" in Section 2(c) employs the word "any". Any is a word of very wide meaning and prime facie the use of it excludes limitation. (See Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 at 297). The definition of premises in Section 2(c) uses the word "includes" at two places. It is well settled that the word "include" is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 93 - Full Document

Dadaji Alias Dina vs Sukhdeobabu & Ors on 7 November, 1979

(See Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu AIR 1980 SC 150; Reserve Bank of India v. Pearless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. AIR 1987 SC 1023 and Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 335). The inclusive definition of "district judge" in Article 236(a) of the Constitution has been very widely construed to include hierarchy of specialized Civil Courts viz. Labour Courts and Industrial Courts which are not expressly included in the definition.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 50 - E S Venkataramiah - Full Document
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