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1 - 10 of 10 (0.18 seconds)Ramnath Prasad vs State Transport Appellate Authority ... on 7 August, 1956
Ramnath Prasad v. State Transport Appellate Authority, AIR 1957 Pat 117, also lays down the same principle. It was observed to be well settled that a power of review is not inherent in any authority and that the moment a right to decide is exercised the authority becomes functus officio, except for the matter of grave clerical error, or mistakes committed by the authority, for which the authority is responsible. Except for correcting its own mistakes there can be no inherent power to review apart from the statute.
Sampu Gowda Hanume Gowda And Ors. vs State Of Mysore And Ors. on 30 March, 1953
Sampu Gowda Hanume Gowda v. State of Mysore, AIR 1953 Mys 156, is also a Full Bench decision holding that jurisdiction or power to review cannot be assumed or imported in tho absence of any specific provision therefor or of even indication of the conditions for the exercise of it. Ramachandra Maradaraj Deo Gam v. Beero Pollai, AIR 1936 Mad 531, is another Full Bench decision in which again it is held that a Court has no power to review unless specially conferred on it. An earlier decision of the Madras Court in Anantharaju Shelly v. Appu Hegade, AIR 1919 Mad 244, also held that the power to review is not inherent in a Court and can only be exercised if it is permitted by statute. The counsel has in this connection questioned the correctness of the Full Bench decision and has submitted that it requires re-examination.
Sri Sri Sri Ramachendra Maradaraj Deo ... vs Beero Pollai And Anr. on 24 September, 1935
Sampu Gowda Hanume Gowda v. State of Mysore, AIR 1953 Mys 156, is also a Full Bench decision holding that jurisdiction or power to review cannot be assumed or imported in tho absence of any specific provision therefor or of even indication of the conditions for the exercise of it. Ramachandra Maradaraj Deo Gam v. Beero Pollai, AIR 1936 Mad 531, is another Full Bench decision in which again it is held that a Court has no power to review unless specially conferred on it. An earlier decision of the Madras Court in Anantharaju Shelly v. Appu Hegade, AIR 1919 Mad 244, also held that the power to review is not inherent in a Court and can only be exercised if it is permitted by statute. The counsel has in this connection questioned the correctness of the Full Bench decision and has submitted that it requires re-examination.
Jagir Singh Sobha Singh And Anr. vs Settlement Commissioner, Pepsu And ... on 2 February, 1959
On behalf of the respondent this order has, however, been sought to be upheld on the basis of a Full Bench authority of this Court in Jagir Singh Sobha Singh v. Settlement Commr. Pepsu, AIR 1959 Punj 457. This authority, it is argued, lays down the general and broad proposition that every tribunal has inherent power to recall its wrong orders and, according to the respondent, it is so irrespective of time limit or of the grounds of error which is sought to be rectified. Dulat, J., who prepared the main judgment in the reported case, observed that every tribunal has inherent power to correct its own errors if circumstances make it necessary in the interest of justice and that such inherent power is necessarily implied in the setting up of any authority on whom responsibility of deciding any matter rests. If a tribunal, and for that matter any other legal authority, decides to recall an order on the ground that it is invalid the act of recall cannot, according to Dulat, J., be quashed merely on the ground that no such recall is permitted by any express provision of a statute. The State in the reported case (it was not a court) was held not debarred from recalling an invalid or unjust and erroneous order made by it previously.
Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh vs Habib Shah on 29 April, 1913
Correction of accidental slips or omissions or clerical of arithmetical mistakes or mistakes inadvertently made like the one found to exist in Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah, ILR 35 All 331, or In re Komara-swami, AIR 1951 Mad 766, might well fall within the inherent power of Courts and quasi-judicial tribunals. It is one thing to say that clerical or accidental mistakes and errors may be corrected under inherent power, or ultra vires and wholly invalid orders which are without jurisdiction and, therefore, nullities, should be ignored or recalled or orders tainted with similar infirmities may be set right, it is quite another thing to throw over-board the established doctrine of res judicata. Against this, our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals must carefully guard, and however tempting the considerations of administrative convenience in a given case of hardship, they are expected to resist the temptation and firmly decline to yield by assuming in themselves any inherent power to vary the final determinations, merely because they may be later shown to be wrong or unjust in some respect, for, otherwise there would be no finality to litigation and controversies and no solemnity of judgments and determinations
The respondent has, however, relying on the two unreported Single Bench decisions mentioned above, argued that I should follow those decisions, and hold that the Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act do possess an inherent power of review. It is true that I should ordinarily follow Single Bench decisions and that in case I do not agree with the view taken therein 1 should refer the matter to a larger Bench. That is a healthy and a wholesome practice deserving of adoption and indeed is adopted by the Courts in this country, In the present case, however, I am inclined to take the view that the petitioner is not entitled to a high prerogative writ because of there being no grave or serious manifest injustice in the matter, with the result that I do not find called upon to refer the matter to a larger Bench for considering the question of the inherent power of review vesting in the tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act. The question will perhaps have to be considered in a more suitable case when the point arises for direct determination. In the case in hand the matter having been merely remanded back to the Appellate Authority for considering the whole matter over again, I do not think there is any occasion for the exercise of the discretionary power of granting a prerogative writ. Bishan Narain, J. in Civil Writ No. 511 of 1960 (Punj) also declined to interfere on the ground that the matter had not been decided finally. Let the question be finally determined, and then the aggrieved party would have sufficient opportunity of having relief against the offending decision in accordance with law.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Anantharaju Shetty vs Appu Hegade on 14 March, 1919
Sampu Gowda Hanume Gowda v. State of Mysore, AIR 1953 Mys 156, is also a Full Bench decision holding that jurisdiction or power to review cannot be assumed or imported in tho absence of any specific provision therefor or of even indication of the conditions for the exercise of it. Ramachandra Maradaraj Deo Gam v. Beero Pollai, AIR 1936 Mad 531, is another Full Bench decision in which again it is held that a Court has no power to review unless specially conferred on it. An earlier decision of the Madras Court in Anantharaju Shelly v. Appu Hegade, AIR 1919 Mad 244, also held that the power to review is not inherent in a Court and can only be exercised if it is permitted by statute. The counsel has in this connection questioned the correctness of the Full Bench decision and has submitted that it requires re-examination.
Aijaz Ahmad vs Nazirul Hasan And Anr. on 29 April, 1935
Reliance has also been placed on the decisions cited before the Full Bench for the view canvassed, e.g., Aijaz Ahmad v. Nazirul Hasan, AIR 1935 All 868, and Assistant Custodian Evacuee Property v. Rattan Chand, 55 Pun LR 336.
Rameshwar Sinha And Anr. vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 15 May, 1959
5. As against these, the petitioner has cited Rameshwar Sinha, v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 6, where a Division Bench of that Court ruled that no authority or Court can claim by implication a power to revise its own order and it is purely a question of statute in absence of which there cannot be a valid review of orders. That case dealt with Motor Vehicles Act and negatived the claim of power to review made on behalf of Regional Transport Authority.
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