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1 - 9 of 9 (0.22 seconds)Section 48 in The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 [Entire Act]
Section 35 in The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 [Entire Act]
Section 42 in The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 [Entire Act]
The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
Champaran Cane Concern vs State Of Bihar And Anr. on 9 April, 1963
Main judgment which has been relied upon is in the case of
Champaran Cane Concern vs. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1963 SC
1737. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme court was examining the
question whether the assessee is a partnership firm or a co-ownership
concern. Distinction between partnership and co-ownership concern was
very aptly drawn. However, this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court
does not answer the question which is posed before this court.
Pamuru Vishnu Vinodh Reddy vs Chillakuru Chandrasekhara Reddy & Ors on 17 February, 2003
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Learned counsel for the respondent have relied upon a
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pamuru
Vishnu Binodh Reddy vs. Chillakuru Chandrasekhar Reddy, (2003) 3
SCC 445. In the aforesaid case, no doubt the Hon'ble Supreme court has
held that valuation of the share of the partner has to be on the date he
retires, however, the facts of the aforesaid case are different. In that case,
there was a firm Vijay Mahal Tehatre and the plaintiff and 4th defendant
retired from the firm in 1971. The court noticed that the plaintiff in the
aforesaid case had sold his share in the partnership and once the partnership
stood dissolved on 05.04.1971, the court held that for the purpose of
ascertaining the value of the share of the plaintiff the relevant date would be
the date on which he retired. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme court was
not dealing with a situation where the normal increase in the value of the
share of the immovable property representing deceased partner is payable to
the heirs of the deceased partner or not. The court addressed the issue with
reference to the profits earned by the firm post the retirement of a partner
which is not the case here. There are other judgments which have referred
to by the first appellate court including a Single Bench of Delhi High Court.
The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and certain others,
however, none of the judgment is answering the question in the manner it is
posed before this court.
Addanki Narayanappa & Anr vs Bhaskara Krishtappa And 13 Ors on 21 January, 1966
Now let's examine the judgment which has been cited by the
learned first appellate court to reverse the judgment of the trial court. First
judgment is in the case of |Addanki Narayanappa & another vs. Bhaskara
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Krishtappa and 13 others, AIR 1966 SC, 1300. On careful reading of the
aforesaid judgment, it is apparent that question which the court posed itself
for answer, is whether the interest of a partner in partnership assets
comprising of immovable as well as movable property should be treated as
movable or immovable property for the purpose of Section 17(1) of the
Registration Act, 1908 . It was in that context, the question was answered
and the court held that the whole concept of partnership is to embark upon a
joint venture and for that purpose to bring in as capital money or even
property including immovable property. Once that is done what is brought
in would cease to be the trading assets of the person who brought in. It
would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the partners would
have interest in proportion to their share in the joint venture of the business
of partnership. The person who brought in would, therefore, not be able to
claim or exercise any exclusive right over any property which eh has
brought in much less over any other partnership property. He would not be
able to exercise his right even to the extent of his share in the business of
the partnership. In the considered view of this court, this is not the question
which arises in the present case, therefore, reliance on the judgment referred
to above was wholly misplaced.
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