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S.A.S. Subbiah Aiyar vs The Official Receiver on 31 August, 1932 cites

Ramathai Anni vs K. Kanniappa Mudaliar And Anr. on 20 January, 1928

344 : 54 M.L.J. 585 and Ramathai Anni v. Kanniappa Mudaliar (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 495 : 55 M.L.J. 235. In those cases on facts similar to the present, the Court had passed orders adjudging the deceased debtor insolvent. The objection raised was that on the language of Section 17 as amended by the Act of 1920 there could be no order of adjudication against a dead man and it was argued that that was the effect of altering the words "as if he were alive" which occurred in the old section to "as far as may be necessary for the realisation and distribution of the property of the debtor". This contention was fully dealt with in the later case and rejected in both cases by this Court, the result being that the proper order to pass in a case like the present is to adjudge the deceased debtor and not his estate. I asked learned Counsel on both sides for any rule or precedent by which an order adjudging the estate insolvent is contemplated by the Provincial Insolvency Act. They did not refer to and I am not aware of any such. It is to be noted that the Provincial Insolvency Act does not contain any provision similar to Sections 108 and 109 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act corresponding to Section 130 of the English Bankruptcy Act empowering the Insolvency Court to administer insolvent estates. Therefore considerations and decisions applicable to that power must not be confused with cases falling within Section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act which corresponds to Section 93 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and Section 112 of the English Bankruptcy Act. The form of the order of adjudication in this case is probably due to this distinction not being borne in mind. However that may be, the contention that when a debtor dies after the petition but before adjudication the powers of the Court under Sections 53 and 54 are automatically withdrawn because the transferor being dead cannot be adjudged insolvent is clearly untenable in view of the decisions above mentioned by which I am bound. It follows that if the order of adjudication in the present case had been in terms one adjudging the debtor, and not his estate, insolvent the ground of the appellant's objection to the proceedings under Sections 53 and 54 would disappear. Learned Counsel for appellant seemed to suggest that he could still maintain his objection and base it on the changed language of Section 17 of the Act. With respect, I fail to see how he can do so except by showing that the two decisions are wrong. Not only am I bound by them but I respectfully agree with them that the change of language in Section 17 was not intended to limit by a side wind the powers of the Court in insolvency when the debtor dies after petition but before adjudication to the power of administration of insolvent estates of persons who die before the petition - a power which is not conferred on Provincial Courts of Insolvency at all. Learned Counsel had to admit that the language of the section cannot have the effect of so limiting the Courts' power where the debtor dies after adjudication. If so, the words which are perfectly general cannot have a different effect merely because the debtor dies at an earlier stage - before adjudication. I am therefore of opinion that the substantial ground of the objection fails.
Madras High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

K. Venkatarama Ayyar And Five Ors. vs The Official Receiver on 20 October, 1927

The appellant, the alienee, took inter alia the objection that the application was incompetent as his transferor had not been declared insolvent but only his estate. This objection was literally correct but only literally so. For it assumed firstly, that when proceedings are continued against the debtor after his death before the order for adjudication, the order passed under Section 17 must be not of the debtor himself but of his estate only and secondly, that when an order is passed as in the present case expressed to be adjudging the estate insolvent, it means in the circumstances something different from an order against the debtor. Both these assumptions are wrong. As to the first point, it is concluded by the authority of Venkatarama Aiyar v. The Official Receiver, Tinnevelly (1927) I.L.R. 51 Mad.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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