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Mt. Chhatarpali And Ors. vs Mt. Kalap Dei And Ors. on 17 July, 1931 cites

Raj Krishna Dey vs Bipin Behari Dey on 18 July, 1912

Hence, as the plaintiffs have stated the value for purposes of jurisdiction, they should be liable to pay the court-fee on the same amount. I do not think this would be correct if the question were raised in the trial Court. It appears to me from the language of Section 8 itself that the value should first be determined for the computation of the court-fee in accordance with the Court-fees Act, and when such value has been determined, it will govern the, value for the purposes of jurisdiction also. It is true that a contrary view has been taken in Raj Krishna Dey v. Bipin Behari Dey [1913] 40 Cal. 245 where their Lordships state;
Calcutta High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Manni Lal vs Radhey Gopalji And Anr. on 11 February, 1925

423 and in Manni Lal v. Radhey Gopalji A.I.R. 1925 All. 602. Here, again, the learned Judge remarks that the plaintiff cannot at one and the same time obtain the services of the highest possible tribunal for the determination of his claim and evade the payment of ad valorem court-fees. If for purposes of jurisdiction ho sets a high value on the relief by way of declaration and a merely nominal value on the relief by way of injunction, it is doing him no injustice to hold that the 'relief sought' on which the court-fee must be levied, is the sum total of the two reliefs.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Karuppana Thevar vs Angammal And Ors. on 25 January, 1926

6. The appellants rely strongly upon the ruling of a single Judge of the Madras High Court in Karuppana Tevar v. Angammal A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 678. This ruling relates to a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation by a Hindu widow is not binding on him, and for the appointment of a receiver to manage the property during the widow's lifetime. In that case it was held that the claim for the appointment of a receiver could not be held to be a consequential "relief as there was no connexion between the two reliefs. It was pointed out that the Court might refuse to grant the declaration and nevertheless might appoint a receiver. Conversely the Court might grant the declaration, and yet refuse to appoint a receiver. I think this ruling can be distinguished upon the facts. Reliefs (b) and (c) in the present suit are declarations that certain alienations made by the widow are not binding upon the reversioners. Relief (d), the appointment of a receiver, might be held to be quite separate and independent of those reliefs. Relief (a) however is a declaration of the plaintiffs' title as next reversioners, I think we may take it as certain that, unless the plaintiffs are able to establish their title as next reversioners, the Court will not grant the prayer for the appointment of a receiver. In hat sense therefore the appointment of a receiver may beheld to be a relief consequential," upon the granting of the declaration of the plaintiffs' title.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Harbans Sahu And Ors. vs Musammat Lalmoni Kuer And Anr. on 10 March, 1921

In Harbans Sahu v. Lalmoni Kuer A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 61 the suit was by a reversioner for declaration that the widow was wasting her husband's estate, and for the appointment of a receiver. Here the appointment of a. receiver was held to be a consequential relief. But this ruling may be distinguished, because the plaintiffs expressly asked for a declaration that the widow was wasting the estate. No such relief is asked for in the present suit. In Krishna rao v. Chandrabhagabai A.I.R. 1924 Nag. 316, the appointment of a receiver was regarded as a consequential relief. But here again the case can be distinguished on the ground that the plaintiffs expressly asked for a declaration that the widow was committing acts of waste.
Patna High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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