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Turlapati Seshayya vs Bollapalli Venkataramayya on 2 May, 1941

In this context the legislative history has also to be taken note of. While interpreting S.23, a Bench of this court held in Seshayya v. Venkataramayya 1941-2 Mad LJ 309 = (AIR 1942 Mad 278), that it will apply only to sales held before the commencement of the Act. The Legislature appears to have accepted the decision as a correct interpretation of that provision and brought in Ss. 23-A by Madras Act 23 of 1948, 23-B by Madras Act 24 of 1950 and 23-C by Madras Act 8 of 1973, for setting aside the sales that had taken place after 30th September 1947, 25th April 1950 and 24th January 1973, respectively. with a view to enable the agriculturist debtors to have the benefit of the corresponding amending Acts. The introduction of Section 23-A, 23-B and 23-C by the various amending Acts would be quite unnecessary if S. 23 can be made applicable to all sales after the commencement of the principal Act. The fact that on each occasion when a benefit is conferred on an agriculturist under a statute a new provision for setting aside a sale is made shows, that earlier provisions for setting aside sales are intended to have a limited application. The intention of the Legislature in enacting Ss. 23-A, 23-B and 23-C appears to be to enable the judgment-debtors to set aside sales held hurriedly just before the introduction of each of the amending Acts conferring certain benefits on the agriculturist debtors. If the provisions in Ss. 23, 23-A, 23-B are construed as applicable to all sales held after the commencement of the relevant Acts, then there is no necessity for a separate provision like Section 23-C. Having regard to all these circumstances. we hold that S. 23-C cannot be invoked in respect of sales that had taken place after the publication of Act 8 of 1973.
Madras High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Kumaraswami Pillai And Anr. vs Thiruvengadatha Aiyangar on 30 March, 1939

N. S. Ramaswami J. in a recent decision in C. M. A. No. 396 of 1975 (Mad) has also followed the earlier decision in Kumarasami Pillai v. Thiruvengadatha Iyengar, 1939-2 Mad LJ 308 = (AIR 1939 Mad 613) and held that once the judgment-debtor invokes the jurisdiction of the court under S. 20 and obtains stay of execution then undoubtedly a period of limitation is prescribed by the proviso which specifically says that unless an application under S. 19 is filed within 60 days of the order of stay the decree shall be executed as it stands. If the above decisions merely laid down that the decree as it stands can be executed if the judgment-debtor does not file an application within 60 days from the date of the order of stay under S. 20, no exception can be taken, as that position is clear from the terms of the proviso itself. However, if these decisions are taken as laying down that the judgment-debtor has no right to file an application under Sec. 19, after the period of 60 days, we are of the view that it is not the correct legal position. The proviso merely says that if the judgment-debtor does not apply to the court which passed the decree under Sec. 20 for relief under Sec. 19 or where the application has been so made and rejected, the decree can be executed as it stands notwithstanding anything contained in the Act to the contrary. The proviso enables the executing court to proceed with the execution of the decree as it stands if the judgment-debtor does not file an application under Sec. 19 within 60 days from the date he obtains an order under S. 20. The proviso does not say that the right of the judgment-debtor to file an application for relief under Sec. 19 is taken away or comes to an end. The proviso which deals with the power of the executing court to execute the decree as it stands cannot be construed as curtailing the power of the court which passes the decree to entertain and deal with an application under S. 19 by the judgment-debtor. The words notwithstanding anything contained in this Act to the contrary' refer only to the restrictions imposed by the Act on the executing court, particularly by Section 7 which prohibits execution of a decree against an agriculturist in so far as a decree is for an amount in excess of the sum as scaled down under Chapter II of the Act. The execution of the decree as it is, by the court cannot be taken as putting an end to the benefits granted to the judgment-debtor by the provisions of the Act particularly by Sec. 19. Even if the sale has taken place in execution of the decree as it stands, still the judgment-debtor can file an application under Sec. 19 and have the decree scaled down and claim the benefit of scaling down at the stage of the application of the sale proceeds. Where an application is made by the judgment-debtor for scaling down after the lapse of 60 days from the grant of stay under Sec. 20 and the decree debt has been scaled down, it is not possible for the sale, even if it had taken place as per the proviso, to be confirmed in the face of the order scaling down the debt.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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