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1 - 10 of 26 (0.32 seconds)Section 106 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 80 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad Gulbarga vs Rachawwa,Widow Of Lochanappa Gugwad ... on 23 October, 1970
(15) In my view, the words underlined by me above are crucial, in that it has to be seen in each case where plea of res judicata is sought to be invoked whether the decision on each of the issues was by itself sufficient for the ultimate decision. This proposition of law was reaffirmed and further elucidated by the Supreme Court in its later decision in Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad v. Rachawwa and others, . Said the Supreme Court: "NOdoubt, it would be open to a Court not to decide all the issues which may arise on the pleadings before it if it finds that the plaint on the face of it is barred by any law. If for instance the: plaintiff's cause of action is against a Government and the plaint docs not show that notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming relief was served in terms of the said Section it would be the duty of the Court to reject the plaint recording an order to that effect with reasons for the order. In such a case the Court should not embark upon a trial of all the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the plaintiff from presetting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. But, where the plaint on the face of it does not show that any relief envisaged by Section 90 of the Code is being claimed, it would be the duty of the Court to go into all the issues which may arise oa the pleadings including the question as to whether notice under Section 80 was necessary if the Court decides the various issues raised on the pleadings, it is difficult to see why the adjudication of the rights of the parties, apart from the question as to the applicability of Section 80 of the Code and absences of notice there under should not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit where the identical question arise for determination between the same parties"
Nagubai Ammal & Others vs B. Shama Rao & Others on 26 April, 1956
The scope of the said rule was explained by the Supreme Court in Nagubai Ammal & others v. B. Shama Rao & others, , as under : "THE true scope of this rule is that evidence let in on issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue, which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, through no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence relating thereto."
Rani Chandra Kunwar vs Chaudhuri Narpat Singh And Raja Makund ... on 14 December, 1906
(26) Their Lordships quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Atkinson in Rani Chandra Kunwar v. Narpat Singh, 34 Indian Appeals 27, that :- "AS both the parties had gone to trial on the question of adoption, and as the plaintiff had not been taken by surprise, the pleas to adoption was open to the defendants, and indeed, the defendants succeeded on that very issue."
Bhagwati Prasad vs Shri Chandramaul on 19 October, 1965
(27) So, the objection raised by the opposite party that no such plea had been raised in the written statement nor was any issue framed thereon was over-ruled by the Judicial Committee. Reference in this context may also be made with advantage to Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, , and Kedar Lal Seal & another v. Hari Lal Seal, . In the former case it was held by the Supreme Court that : "CONSIDERATIONS of form cannot over-ride the legitimate considerations of substance. If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence."
Kidar Lall Seal And Another vs Hari Lall Seal on 18 December, 1951
(28) In Kedar Lal Seal (supra), Bose, J., speaking for the court observed : "I would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleas ding when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, however clumsily or inartistically the plaint may be worded."
Rattan Lal vs Vardesh Chander & Ors on 9 December, 1975
(29) The principle object of pleadings and the requirement of Rule 2 of Order Vi of the Code obviously is that the opposite party may know what are the facts on which the other party relies in order that be may be prepared to meet the case. So, law insists that the pleadings should be precise and clear but where all the necessary facts are before the Court and the parties have fully argued on them, a contention in the appeal Court that a plea has not been set out in the pleadings and hence, it should not have been gone into, would not be entertained. As for proceedings under the Act, the strict law of pleadings and for that matter other procedural provisions embodied in the Code are not applicable. However, Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959, which were framed pursuant to the power conferred by Section 56 of the Act on the Central Government provides that in deciding any question relating to procedure not specially provided by the Act and the Rules, the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal shall as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code. Hence, insistence on strict and scrupulous compliance with the law of pleadings as contained in the Code is misconceived. Only substantial compliance with the law of pleadings would be enough. I am fortified in this view of the matter by the following observations of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander& others, : "THE Rent Act contemplates no elaborate pleadings but filling out of particulars in a perform which takes the place of a plaint. No specific averment of forfeiture and consequent determination of the lease is found in the petition. Having regard to the comparative informality of these proceedings and the quasi-judicial nature of the whole process, such an omission cannot be exaggerated into a lethal infirmity."
Man Mohan Mehra vs J.S. Butalia on 4 July, 1983
(31) His Lordship adhered to this view consistently in his various decisions. (Sec Ram Gopal v. Washeshwar Nath, , Manmohan Mehra v. J. S. Butalia, and Kanwal Narain v. l.f. Tellis, 1984 Rlr 10). The gist of these authorities is that (a) the rule that no Amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was not put forward is not absolute and the general application of this rule may result in Lordship if not injustice ; and (b) to insist upon the reproduction of what the provisions of the statute are, is to ask the applicant to plead law. At any rate, such an omission can be allowed to be rectified by replication, by better particulars or by an amendment and in any event, an application cannot be thrown out if there is a partial disclosure of cause of action.