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1 - 10 of 11 (5.76 seconds)Section 63 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 313 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 65 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 59 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) vs Navjot Sandhu@ Afsan Guru on 4 August, 2005
22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted
hereinbefore, being a special provision, the general law on
secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of
the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus
non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general
law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59
and 65-A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record.
Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of
secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is
wholly governed by Sections 65-A and 65-B. To that extent, the
statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence
pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this Court
in Navjot Sandhu case [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu,
(2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715] , does not lay
down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and
we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence
shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements
under Section 65-B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD,
VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the
certificate in terms of Section 65-B obtained at the time of
taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence
pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible."
The Income Tax Act, 1961
Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 251 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Roman Catholic Mission vs State Of Madras And Another on 14 January, 1966
"20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has
relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966
SC 1457] in support of his submission that a document not
admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be
excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with
the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case.
However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct
position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to
the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered
and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of
documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an
objection that the document which is sought to be proved
is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection
does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence
but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to
be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a
document has been marked as "an exhibit", an objection as to
its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised
even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter
case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is
tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence
and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have
been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving
the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any
stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit.
The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is
whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time,
would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the
defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular.
The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the
party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence
to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious
about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection
does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two
reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and
CRL.L.P. 344/2019 Page 9 of 10
pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and
there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the
mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party
tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of
the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and
thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is
available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and
procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of
objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to
raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the
necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the
document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible
in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to
raising the objection in a superior court."