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1 - 10 of 18 (0.56 seconds)Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921
The U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965
The Companies Act, 1956
Sikta Mahoogarh Sadhan Sahkari Samiti ... vs Prescribed Authority Under The Payment ... on 17 September, 2014
13. In this case the services and rights of the respondent no. 5 are governed exclusively by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971. Both the enactments are comprehensive in nature and squarely cover the dispute before the labour court. The law laid down in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra) as well as Sikta Mahoogarh (supra) will be squarely applicable to the facts to this case. The jurisdiction of the labour court and the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the facts of this case was ousted by virtue of the operation of the UP Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971.
The Payment Of Wages Act, 1936
Damji Valji Shah And Another vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India & ... on 8 April, 1965
64. A general Act's operation may be curtailed by a later special Act even if the general Act will be more readily inferred when the later special Act also contains an overriding non obstante provision. Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) provides that when the winding-up order is passed or the Official Liquidator is appointed as a provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of winding-up order shall be proceeded with against the company except by leave of the court. Under Section 446(2), the Company Court, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force is given jurisdiction to entertain any suit, proceeding or claim by or against the company and decide any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding-up. The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act 31 of 1956) constituted a tribunal and Section 15 of the Act enabled Life Insurance Corporation to file a case before the tribunal for recovery of various amounts from the erstwhile Life Insurance Companies in certain respects. Section 41 of the LIC Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal in these matters. On examination of these Acts, it was held [Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India, AIR 1966 SC 135] that the provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal being provisions of the special Act i.e. the LIC Act prevailed over the aforesaid provisions of the general Act viz. the Companies Act which is an Act relating to companies in general and, therefore, the tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with a claim of Life Insurance Corporation against a former insurer which had been ordered to be wound up by the Company Court.