Vadlamanati Venkatanarayana Rao vs Gottumukkule Venkata Somaraju on 3 March, 1937
Reliance cannot now be placed on the opinion of the two learned Judges in Venkatanarayana v. Somaraju (1937) 2 M.L.J. 251 : I.L.R. 1937 Mad.
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1 - 10 of 16 (0.35 seconds)Km. Kr. Km. Kuppan Chettiar And Ors. vs Masa Goundan And Ors. on 14 December, 1936
See also Kuppan Chettiar v. Masa Goundan (1937) 1 M.L.J. 249 : I.L.R. 1937 Mad, Official Receiver, Guntur v. Seshayya (1940) 2 M.L.J. 860, Rangaswami Goundan v. Kandaswami Goundan (1942) 2 M.L.J. 361. The fact that Vairavan Chettiar consented to a charge being created on the plaintiff's share of the house as part of the decree in C.S. No. 381 of 1929 would not make any difference.
Govindoss Krishnadoss vs The Official Assignee Of Madras on 8 May, 1934
This statement of the law considered in tlie context in which it occurs, means that the transaction is incidental to and for the purpose of winding up of the partnership. It is not permissible to give it any wider meaning or a general application to analogous cases. In the case of a dissolved partnership, it is settled law that the partners are entitled to an account of the assets of the partnership property free from debts secured or unsecured incurred by the managing partner except in so far as those were incurred for the purpose of winding up or so far as the 'creditors bonafide and reasonably believed that they were so incurred. See Govindoss v. Official Assignee of Madras (1934) 67 M.L.J. 167 : L.R. 61 I.A. 257 : (1934) 67 M.L.J. 167 : L.R. 61 I.A. 257. We need hardly point out that the Partnership Act as such has no application to a joint Hindu family business and a trade or business is like any other asset of the joint family subject to the rules of Hindu law and the limitations on the powers of a manager which arise as a consequence of a partition in the family. As we have already pointed out, partition puts an end to the power of the manager of the family to alienate the interests of the junior members in the family properties even to the extent of discharging pre-partition debts of the family. If we accept Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar's arguments in toto, it would result in the recognition of a power in A to sell B's property for a debf for which both A and B might be liable without reference to B or even against his wishes. Such a power can be exercised only if sanctioned by some statutory provision or well-recognised rule of Hindu law and not on grounds of mere convenience or expediency. Mr. Venkatarama (Aiyar, however, states that the strict rule of Hindu law must be and has been considerably modified to suit fhe exigencies of modern business and to protect the interests of creditors bona fide dealing with the manager of as Hindu trading family. We find it difficult to grasp with precision what, according to him, are the metes and bounds of the field within which an ex-manager of a family business can act so as to bind the interests of the other members.
P.A.R. Ramaswami Chettiar vs Srinivasa Iyer And Ors. on 5 August, 1935
12. Reliance has been placed on two recent decisions of this Court reported in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Srinivasa Iyer (1935) 70 M.L.J. 214 and Ramachandrappa v. Narayanappa A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 339. Both these decisions recognise that it is not possible to apply the principles of the law of partnership to a joint family business and that, apart from any question of estoppel by holding out, a junior member of the family after partition is not in the same position as a partner of a dissolved firm. Dealing with the position of the manager of a joint family business vis-a-vis the junior members after partition, Venkatasubba Rao, O.C.J., in the first of the two cases referred to above, observed:
Nalam Ramayya And Ors. vs Nalam Achamma on 17 July, 1944
Though Ex. P-2 recites the prior drawing of lots, it embodies the terms of the partition arrangement, including the allotment of different portions of the house to the two shares and the covenants entered into between.! them regarding the upkeep of the house and the sharing of the common expenditure. In our view, Ex. P-2 cannot be construed as containing merely recitals of an anterior and completed partition. Ex facie, it purports to embody a division by metes and bounds and being unregistered, is inadmissible to prove a division, vide Ramayya v. Achamma (1944) 2 M.L.J. 164 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 160 (F.B.). Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar for the appellant did not controvert this position. It has throughout been the case for the plaintiff that there was a division in status, total and complete, with reference to the entire estate and not merely with reference to the house now in question. In the course of his reply, however, Mr. Qopalaswami Aiyangar sought to develop an argument that Ex. P-2 would be available to prove a division in status between the plaintiff and Vairavan Chettiar quoad the house dealt with by the document, though not a division by metes and bounds.
K. Ramalinga Annavi vs Narayana Annavi And Ors. on 26 February, 1917
In a later case, the Judicial Committee observed that it was open to the members of a joint family to enter into a partnership in respect of a portion of the joint family property--a sugar factory in that case--after dividing that item into specific shares. There was no division by metes and bounds of the factory in that case.