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1 - 9 of 9 (0.24 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Amar Kanta Sen vs Sovana Sen And Anr. on 18 December, 1959
In Amar Kanta Sen v. Sovana Sen, AIR 1960 Cal 438, Datta, J. of the Calcutta High Court held that even an unchaste wife had an absolute right to a starving allowance for her maintenance and that this right would be enforceable even where the wife had been divorced on the ground of her adultery. This provision is intended to prevent the wife's starvation and where she has an income of her own, her right to this bare subsistence disappears.
Dr. Tarlochan Singh S/O Dr. Sunder Singh vs Smt. Mohinder Kaur D/O Ghanya Singh on 3 August, 1961
The application for maintenance had been filed in lower Court in February 1966 and the arrears from that date at the rate fixed may run into a few thousands. It may not be possible for a Government servant with a fixed monthly income to pay such heavy arrears. The appellant has been able to maintain herself somehow for the period of the last about 3 1/2 years and the maintenance allowance can, therefore, be made payable from the date of filing the appeal in this Court. The fact that the Court has discretion in the matter of fixing the date and that it is not incumbent on it to allow arrears of maintenance from the date of application was recognised in Dr Tarlochan Singh v. Mohinder Kaur, ILR (1963) 1 Punj 74 and Smt. Hamibai v. Smt. Kundibai, AIR 1940 Sind 222, though it was observed that the conduct of the parties shall have to be kept in mind.
Section 24 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Minarani Majumdar vs Dasarath Majumdar on 11 February, 1963
In Minarani Majumdar v. Dasarath Majumdar, AIR 1963 Cal 428, it was laid down that an order for separate maintenance under Section 25 could be passed in favour of a married woman living apart from her husband after the passing of a decree for divorce or nullity or judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights even though the decree remains uncomplied with. The condition that the maintenance was to be paid while the applicant remains unmarried was supposed to be attached to every order for maintenance and in the context of Section 25(1) the condition only meant that the applicant had not been remarried.
The Parsi Marriage And Divorce Act, 1936
Kadia Harilal Purshottam vs Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas on 1 February, 1961
Similarly, in Kadia Harilal Purshottam v, Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas. AIR 1961 Guj 202. it was held that the expression 'while the applicant remains unmarried' was not intended to limit the scope of Section 25 and that the intention of the legislature was that order for permanent alimony could be passed on or after the passing of any of the reliefs referred to in the earlier sections of the Act. These words were held not to restrict the application of Section 25 to only those cases where a party was in a position to contract a second marriage or where the marriage bond stood dissolved or severed. This condition was supposed to govern the conduct of the parties in future and the maintenance order could be taken advantage of by the applicant only as long as he had remained immarried meaning thereby that in spite of his being in a position to do so. the applicant had not contracted another marriage.
Hormusji M. Kalapesi vs Dinbai H. Kalapesi on 25 February, 1955
A similar view has been taken in Dr. Hormusji M. Kalapesi v. Dinbai H. Kalapesi, AIR 1955 Born 413 (DB), a case under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, which has, strange to say, been cited by the respondent's counsel. _Section 30 of that Act may appear to be in pari materia with Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act except for the fact that the chastity of the wife besides her unmarried state have been given as the requisite condition entitling her to permanent alimony after the passing of any decree under the Act. In para. 8 at p. 416, reference is also made to the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act which has been enacted in substantially similar terms. The Hon'ble Judges observed that so far as they were aware it had been the consistent practice of the Court to entertain applications for alimony even in the case of defaulting or guilty wives and to deal with them on merits. An application made for alimony had, so far as the Hon'ble Judges were aware, never been thrown out on the preliminary ground that the petition had been made by a guilty wife. English case law was discussed and it was found that it was never intended that a guiltv wife should be turned out on the streets to starve. Cases were contemplated where under certain circumstances a wife, who had been divorced on the ground of adultery could be awarded maintenance or alimony. The existence of an unsatisfied decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the wife may not, therefore, seem to disentitle her to permanent alimony. With great respect I may say that the learned Judge, who decided the case of Surjit Kaur alias Bibo, F. A. F. O. No. 55-M of 1962, D/- 1-10-1964 (Punj) mentioned in the order of reference had not cited any cases in support of his views,
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