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Palaniswami Goundar vs Devanai Ammal And Ors. on 6 October, 1955 cites

Lakshmi Ammal And Ors. vs Narayanaswami Naicker And Ors. on 24 October, 1949

10. In view of the opinion of the Full Bench that the Act is not retrospective in nature, it will not be open to the plaintiffs to take advantage of the second marriage of the defendant and claim maintenance. But the suit for separate maintenance is based on other grounds as cruelty, abandonment, etc. Though issues were raised whether the defendant was guilty of cruelty and desertion, the trial Court did not consider it necessary to go into those issues as in its view it was sufficient if the defendant was married for a second time, and following the decision of Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Lakshmi Ammal v. Narayanaswami Naicker (1950) 1 M.L.J. 63, the trial Court held that the first plaintiff was entitled to separate maintenance and granted a decree at Rs. 220 per month, of which Rs. 150 was for the first plaintiff and Rs. 35 for each of the other two plaintiffs who are the daughters. It therefore becomes necessary that the suit must be heard on the other issues and the rights of the first plaintiff at any rate will depend upon the findings which will be given on those issues. In the circumstances the appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court is set aside and the suit is remanded for disposal in the light of these observations and the opinion of the Full Bench on the question as to the retrospective nature of the Act. Court-fee paid on the appeal will be refunded. Costs will abide the result.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Musunuru Nagendramma vs Musunuru Ramakotayya on 3 September, 1953

The latest decision of our Court on this point is that in Nagendramma v. Ramakotayya (1955) 1 M.L.J. 25, a decision of Subba Rao and Ramaswami, JJ. In the leading judgment delivered by Ramaswami, J., several points were dealt with by him on which, however, Subba Rao, J., did not express his opinion. But he agreed with Ramaswami, J. on the interpretation of the clause in question. After referring to the decisions of this Court cited by me above and other decisions of this and other Courts, the learned Judge, Ramaswami, J., came to the following conclusion:
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 17 - Full Document

Sidda Setty vs Muniamma on 8 January, 1953

He expressly dissented from Viswanatha Sastri, J. This learned Judge had taken a similar view even earlier in A.S. No. 596 of 1949, though it was not necessary to express a final opinion in that case. Subsequently, the same question arose before a Division Bench, of which he was a member, the other learned Judge being Govinda Menon, J., and the Division Bench decided to refer the matter for decision by a Full Bench. In the order of reference made by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., on behalf of the Bench, the learned Judge, besides referring to the earlier decisions of this Court, also referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court and another of the Nagpur High Court, in which the view which he was inclined to take had been adopted. I shall now refer to these two decisions.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Balaji Singh vs Chakka Gangamma And Anr. on 6 August, 1926

Before us, it was argued that the Act is declaratory and therefore presumably retrospective. I agree with the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court that it is not a declaratory Act, at any rate so far as the clause in question is concerned. The Act in form is not declaratory. The words generally employed in statutes of that class, are absent. According to Craies' Statute Law, 4th Edition, page 61, a declaratory Act usually, if not invariably, contains a preamble and also the word " declared " as well as the word " enacted ". An instance of such a declaratory Act is given in Maxwell, 10th edition, page 222, namely, the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889, which declared that the provisions of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, Section 38, with regard to the imposition of stamp duties upon personal property passing under voluntary settlement should be construed as if marriage settlements were included, though until then they had not been regarded as voluntary settlements. There are several instances of such Acts in India as well; as for example, Act XXV of 1948, which added Section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act. An amending Act explaining a particular expression already used in the original Act may be declaratory in nature. Such was Act XXVII of 1926 which inserted in Section 3, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a definition of the word "attested" [Balaji Singh v. Gangamma (1926) 51 M.L.J. 641). I am clearly of opinion that Clause (4) of Section 2 of the Act is not declaratory in nature.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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