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Rameswar Mandal And Ors. vs Provabati Debi on 27 May, 1914

In Rameswar Mandal v. Provabati Debi 25 Ind. Cas. 84 : 20 C.L.J. 23 at p. 31 : 19 C.W.N. 313 it was explained that when a sale has been held in execution of a decree obtained against a limited owner, such as a Hindu widow, to enforce satisfaction of a debt, secured or unsecured, created by her, the real question is, what was liable to be and was actually sold. In the investigation of this question, the frame of the suit, the judgment, the decree, the execution proceedings, the sale proclamation, the amount of purchase-money and the conduct of the parties, must all be taken into account; the sale certificate is by no means conclusive. As the proceeding may be against the widow personally or against the widow as representing her husband's estate, the true test is to see whether the proceeding in which the sale was directed was brought against the widow personally or with a view to affect the whole inheritance. It is not necessary that the reversioner should be joined as party to the suit, but if he is so joined, the fact would afford clear indication that the creditor intended to make the inheritance liable and not to restrict his remedy to the qualified interest of the widow.
Calcutta High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh vs Debi Dayal Sahu on 4 January, 1908

L.R. 591 : 11 C.W.N. 474 : 4 A.L.J. 232 : 2 M.L.T. 145 : 17 M.L. J. 233 : 10 O.C. 117 (P.C), Singam Setti v. Draupadi Bayamma 31 M. 153 : 3 M.L.T. 251 : 18 M.L..J. 11, Ramdei Kunwar v. Abu Jafar 27 A. 494 : A.W.N. (1905) 68, Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu 35 I.A. 48 : 35 C. 420 : 7 C.L.J. 335 : 12 C.W. N. 303 : 10 Bom. L.R. 230 : 5 A.L.J. 184 : 18 M.L.J. 100 : 3 M.L.T. 344 : 14 Bur. L.R. 49 (P.C.). This principle, applicable to a case of an excessive sale by a Hindu widow, cannot, however, be invoked by the plaintiffs, as the case before us is not one of excessive sale. No doubt, the mortgage was granted for a loan which was in part taken for purposes not comprised within the category of legal necessity; but the decree in the mortgage suit remedied this defeat, and directed a sale of the hypothecated property, only for so mush of the mortgage money as could be deemed to have been raised for legitimate objects. In such circumstances, the execution purchaser cannot be called upon to submit to redemption, in whole or in part, with regard to the property in his hands.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 31 - Full Document

Bhagirathi Das vs Baleshwar Bagarti on 6 May, 1913

In Bhagirathi Dass v. Baleswar Bagarti 19 Ind. Cas. 66 : 41 C. 69 : 19 C.L.J. 155 : 17 C.W.N. 877 it was pointed out that there is a fundamental distinction between the two classes of eases, namely, the case where a mortgagee BUSH a widow to enforce a mortgage executed by her husband, and the case where a mortgagee sues a widow to enforce a mortgage executed by herself. In the former cage, no question of propriety of the transaction arises; in the latter case, if the mortgagee seeks to obtain a decree entitling him to proceed against not merely the qualified interest of the widow but the entire inheritance, the question of legal necessity arises, which can be finally decided only in the presence of the reversioner. But it does not follow that a reversionary heir, when so drawn into the litigation, is not entitled to urge that as he cannot be called upon to redeem, he would prefer to be left alone, with liberty to contest the title of the mortgagee or of the purchaser at the sale in execration of the mortgage-decree, if he should ever succeed as the actual reversionary heir.
Calcutta High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Nanda Lal Dhur Biswas vs Jagat Kishore Acharjya Chowdhuri on 17 July, 1916

Indeed, if the matter were open for reconsideration, and the Court were free to examine afresh the question of legal necessity, such materials as are available even at this distance of time would point to the conclusion that the view adopted in the mortgage suit was based upon a correct appreciation of the facts and circumstances : Nanda Lal (Banga Chandra) v. Jagat Kishore Acharjya , Chintamanibhatla Venkata Reddi Pantulu Garu v. Rani Saheba of Wadhuan . We hold accordingly that the decree in the mortgrge suit must be treated as obtained fairly and properly against the then reversioner and consequently operative now against the ultimate reversioners.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 64 - Full Document

V. Venkatanarayana Pillai vs V. Subbammal And Anr. on 12 March, 1912

49 : 25 C.LJ. 391 : 22 C.W.N. 350 it was observed that when a mortgagee from a Hindu widow seeks to obtain a decree which would bind not merely the qualified interest of the widow but the entire inheritance itself, the then next reversioner is a proper party to the suit, and when, in addition to the widow, the reversioner is so impleaded, he may well be deemed a party in a representative capacity, as explained by the Judicial Committee in Venkatanarayana Pillay v. Subbammal , with the result that a decree fairly made in his presence, so long as it stands, binds the inheritance whether he of some one else ultimately becomes the actual reversioner when the succession opens out on the death of the widow. The title of the purchaser in such a case can consequently be defeated by the actual reverisoner, only after the decree which is the root of that title, has been successfully impeached for fraud, collusion or other like reason. These principles, which may now be deemed firmly established, are plainly of no assistance to the plaintiffs. Here the mortgage suit was not and could not be brought against the widow, who bad created the encumbrance and died before the security could be enforced. The suit was instituted, in these circumstances, against the then immediate reversioner, who, though a limited owner as a female heiress, completely represented the estate at the time. She raised the question of the factum and propriety of the mortgage transaction, as she was competent to do, and her resistance did in fact prove partially successful. The decree, thus fairly and properly obtained against her, so long as it is not successfully impeached on the ground of fraud, collusion or other like reason, binds the inheritance when claimed by the ultimate reversioners. The plaintiffs cannot now recover the property from the bands of the execution purchaser on the ground that as they were not themselves parties to the mortgage suit, their are entitled to exercise their right of redemption. The plain truth is that at the time of the mortgage suit, the equity of redemption was vested exclusively in the daughter of the original owner, and the plaintiffs as reversioners in the second degree, assuming all of them to have been born at the time, had no subsisting interest therein.
Madras High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 23 - Full Document

Hridyanath Roy And Ors. vs Ram Chandra Barua Sarma And Ors. on 20 May, 1920

11. It has finally been argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the sale in execution of the mortgage-decree (which, it may be noted, was made and enforced before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) was held in contravention of the direction contained therein. This argument is based on the assertion that the sale was held for realisation of the entire decretal amount, and not merely of the specific sum declared as leviable from the hypothecated property. This is an unproved hypothesis, The sale proclamation is not in existence and there is no secondary evidence as to its contents. We cannot consequently held with any approach to certainty that it was proclaimed that the sale would be held for realisation of the entire decretal amount, But let us assume that the proclamation did in fact contain an erroneous statement as to the amount recoverable by the sale of the mortgaged property. That clearly did not affect the legality of the sale. The Court had jurisdiction to sell the property; that jurisdiction was not taken away because an incorrect statement was made as to the amount recoverable by the decree-holder. As pointed out by the Full Bench in the case of Hridyanath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barua Sarma 58 Ind. Cas. 806 : 31 C.L.J. 482 : 24 C.W.N. 723 (F.B.): 48 G. 138, there is a fundamental distinction between existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 11 - Full Document
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