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1 - 7 of 7 (0.03 seconds)Section 271D in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 273B in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Smt. Panna Devi Chowdhary (Legal ... vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 22 March, 1994
Further, the Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Dr. B.G. Panda v. Dy. CIT (supra) had held as under :
Commissioner Of Income Tax, U.P.-Ii, ... vs Bazpur Co-Operative Sugar Factory ... on 6 May, 1988
In this respect reliance is placed on CIT v. Bazpur Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. (1989) 177 ITR 469 (SC) and CIT v. Bazpur Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. (1988) 172 ITR 321 (SC).
Hindustan Steel Ltd vs State Of Orissa on 4 August, 1969
8. Applying the above ratio to the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that there was any element of loan or deposit as alleged by the assessing officer. In the instant case, there is yet another aspect of the matter. As an alternative, it was contended that in any case, the assessee has received contribution from his wife and son under the bona fide belief that as the amount was available in cash and they were not giving the amount as loans and it is not required to be paid by account payee cheques. The ass6ssee also pleaded that as the amount, in question, was being given by his family members with a clear understanding that same is contribution for the construction of house. According to the learned counsel for the assessee, for the sake of argument that if it is assumed that there was a default, the default can be considered as venial breach of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) has held that when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. In the instant case, the assessee entertained a belief which was bona fide that the amounts received from wife and son were contributions and not loan or deposit within the meaning of section 269SS of the Act. The assessee was of the opinion that the amount, in question, did not require to be received by an account payee cheque or account payee draft. In our view, there was a reasonable cause and no penalty should have been levied. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has referred to the observations made in the assessment order wherein it was stated that the assessee had later on sold the said property in his own name as the exclusive owner of the property and the whole sale proceeds have been credited in his bank account. In our view, the findings given in the assessment proceedings are relevant but not conclusive in the penalty proceedings. It is true that as the assessment proceedings and the penalty proceedings are two separate and independent proceedings because the consideration that arises in the penalty proceedings are different from those arising in the assessment proceedings. In fact, in that view of the matter, we have to see as to whether the assessee has violated the provisions of section 269SS of the Act. Simultaneously, we have also to see that what was the explanation of the assessee. In the instant case, the assessee took the plea that firstly, there was no violation of the provisions of section 269SS of the Act. Secondly, there was a reasonable cause. Thirdly, the assessee was under the bona fide belief that he was not required to receive the amount otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee draft. As an alternative submissions, it was contended that the default can be considered either technical or venial breach of the provisions of law, and, therefore, no penalty under section 271D was leviable. In our view, there was a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B of the Act and, therefore, no penalty is leviable under section 271D of the Act. We accordingly find merit in the appeal of the assessee and delete the penalty levied by the assessing officer and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
Messrs Mehta Parikh & Co vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax,Bombay on 10 May, 1956
4. The persons who have contributed funds for purchase of property have also filed their affidavits wherein they have stated on oath that the amount given by them to the appellant was not a loan but was a contribution by them towards purchase of house. The affidavits filed by the contributors have remained unrebutted by the department. Therefore, the correctness of the assertions made in the affidavit to the effect that no loans have been given have remained unchallenged. The Supreme Court in Mehta Parikh & Co. v. CIT (1956) 30 ITR 181 (SC) has held that if the person who gave the affidavit is not cross-examined it is not open to the revenue to challenge the correctness of the statements made in the affidavit. Relying upon the said judgment the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1962 All 407 has held that it is not open to a party to brush aside the averments in the affidavit by merely stating that the allegations were untrue.
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