Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 21 (0.20 seconds)Sham Sundar Lal And Ors. vs Achhan Kunwar And Anr. on 27 July, 1898
In the case of Sham Sunder v. Achhan Kunwar 25 I.A. 183 : 21 A. 71 : 2 C.W.N. 729 which is the foundation of the argument addressed to us on behalf of the appellant, the question arose as to the validity of certain mortgages one of which was executed by the widow and the other by the daughter of the original owner with the concurrence in each case of the reversionary heirs. It was found that the alienation by the widow or the daughter was not binding upon the estate. The question, therefore, arose whether the reversionary heir was affected. Their Lordships observed that in 1877, the date of the first bond, neither Achhan Koer nor Enayet Singh who were the reversionary heirs and had joined in the transaction could by Hindu Law make a disposition of or bind their expectant interests.
Brinda Chowdhrain vs Radhica Chowdhrain on 27 March, 1885
9. It was faintly suggested at one stage of the argument that the applicant for probate was not entitled to apply for revocation under Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, as although no citation was issued upon him, he had full knowledge of the proceedings and was consequently debarred from claiming any assistance from the Court upon the principle of the decision in Brinda Chowdhrain v. Radhica Chowdhrain 11 C. 492 and Nistariny Dabya v. Brohmomoyi Dabya 18 C.45. The answer to this argument, however, is obvious.
Section 69 in The Probate and Administration Act, 1977 [Entire Act]
Khettramoni Dasi vs Shyama Churn Kundu And Ors. on 17 January, 1894
The daughter then appealed to this Court and her appeal succeded Khetramoni Dasi v. Shyma Churn Kundu 21 C. 539. The case was then, remanded, and the question of the genuineness of the will was investigated in the presence of the daughter. The District Judge held that the will was genuine and granted probate. Upon appeal to this Court, that judgment was reversed, and probate was refused. The matter was then taken on appeal to the Judicial Committee and the appeal was defended by the daughter. Their Lordships with full knowledge of the facts just stated, did not hold that the daughter had no locus standi, but considered the case on the merits and reversed the decision of this Court. If, as has now been contended by the learned Vakil for the appellant, the daughter as reversionary heir was not entitled to be represented in the proceedings at all, it is a matter for surprise that this question should have escaped the counsel for the appellant, as well as the members of the Judicial Committee, two of whom at any rate (Lord Hobhouse and Sir Richard Couch) had considerable experience of Indian law and might be assumed to have been quite familiar with the nature of the position and rights of a reversioner under the Hindu law. We may add that if the view put forward by the appellant were accepted, irremediable injustice of the gravest character might be done to the reversioner. It would be quite open to the widow, for instance, of a Hindu who had died intestate, to propound a forged will and get probate thereof without contest. Under the will she might have absolute power of alienation or authority to take a son in adoption, and thus be placed in a position to deprive the reversioner of the estate to which he would otherwise be legitimately entitled. We are not prepared, therefore, to put upon Section 69 the narrow construction which we have been invited to place upon it by the learned Vakil for the appellant. The grant of probate operates as a judgment in rem and as has been repeatedly pointed out in the English Courts, it is of the utmost importance that such grant should be made after full opportunity to enter appearance has been afforded to all persons who are likely to be affected by the grant. The principle which is followed in England in pases of this character is thus stated in a well-known work: "Any interest however slight and even it seems the bare possibility of an interest is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary, paper. Thus where a testator disposed of all his personal estate by his will and gave his real estate but none of his personal, to his brother's children, and by a codicil he gave them pecuniary legacies revoking the devise to them of the real estate which was of greater value than the legacies, it was held that they might oppose the codicil alone, notwithstanding their only right to a share of the personal estate was under it. Though a next-of-kin may as such oppose all the testamentary papers, he has not a right to oppose any particular one he may think fit; for some interest in it however remote is necessary "(Will liams on Executors Vol. I page 245).
Abhiram Dass vs Gopal Dass on 19 June, 1889
We only observe that the learned Judges who decided the case of Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass 17 C. 48 expressed their dissent from the test formulated by Mr. Justice Field.
Kishen Dai vs Satyendra Nath Dutt And Ors. on 31 May, 1901
Reference was also made in the course of the argument to the decision in Kishen Dai v. Satyendra Nath Butt 17 C.48 in which it was held that a judgment-creditor of a person who, but for a will, would receive the property by inheritance had sufficient interest to entitle him to oppose ' the grant of probate.
Shama Charn Kundu vs Khettromoni Dasi on 9 December, 1899
We may further point out that the view we take is supported by implication by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Shama Charn Kundu v. Khettromoni Dasi 27 C. 521 : 4 C.W.N. 501. In that case, upon application for probate of the will of one Madhusudan, caveat was entered by his widow. She afterwards withdrew her opposition and thereupon one of her daughters filed objection to the grant of probate. It was contended that as a reversioner, she had no interest in the estate left by the deceased and was consequently not entitled to be heard. This objection prevailed and an order for grant of probate was made as in a non-contentious proceeding.
Rahamtullah Sahib vs Rama Rau And Anr. on 4 May, 1894
7. The second ground upon which the decision of the District Judge is questioned is that the petitioner for revocation was not entitled to be heard upon more assertion of his relationship with the deceased, but if at all, only upon proof of the alleged adoption. Now there can be no doubt that before a person can be permitted to contest a will, the party propounding has the right to call on him to show that he has some interest Hingeston v. Tucker 2 Sw. & Tr. 596; Rahamtullah Sahib v. Rama Rau 17 M. 373. In the case before us, however, it is manifest from the proceedings in the Court below that the question of the factum and validity of the adoption of the present respondent was not seriously challenged. No doubt the somewhat ambiguous statement in the original application for probate by the present appellant that Srireswar was the adopted son of Shoblia Sundari does not create an estoppel. At the same time from the evidence already on the record, which we have examined, it is fairly clear that the status of Sureswar as an adopted son has been prima facie established for the purposes of the present litigation. This evidence, which as already explained, was taken at the instance of the cousin of the deceased who had entered a caveat and questioned the adoption of Sureswar is, in our opinion, sufficient to render further investigation needless in the course of the present proceeding. The second ground taken on behalf of the appellant entirely fails.
Nistariny Dabya, Miner, By Her Guardian ... vs Brahmomoyi Dabya on 11 July, 1890
9. It was faintly suggested at one stage of the argument that the applicant for probate was not entitled to apply for revocation under Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, as although no citation was issued upon him, he had full knowledge of the proceedings and was consequently debarred from claiming any assistance from the Court upon the principle of the decision in Brinda Chowdhrain v. Radhica Chowdhrain 11 C. 492 and Nistariny Dabya v. Brohmomoyi Dabya 18 C.45. The answer to this argument, however, is obvious.