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1 - 10 of 14 (0.32 seconds)Mahindra And Mahindra Limited And Anr. vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Anr. on 23 January, 1986
In fact, in the Bench decision of this Court referred to above, i.e., Mahindra and, Mahindra Ltd. v. State of A.P. [1986] 63 STC 274, it has been held that the words "specified class" occurring in section 9(1)(i) before the expression "goods", do not operate as words of limitation on the power of the Government. It was held that it is open to the Government to exempt goods generally, or exempt a class of goods, or exempt a specified class of goods. It was also held that mere mention of the manufacturer does not introduce any infirmity into the notification. In other words, according to the said judgment, the absence of the words "specified goods" in section 9(1)(i) does not in any manner curtail the power of exemption inhering in the Government, as is sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner with reference to the language employed in other sales tax enactments.
Jalan Trading Co. (Private Ltd.) vs Mill Mazdoor Union(With Connected ... on 5 August, 1966
Under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9, the Government can exempt "any specified class of goods", while under clause (ii) it can exempt "any specified class of persons", but it is not competent for the Government to issue a notification mixing both the clauses. A notification issued exempting a particular person and the goods manufactured by him alone, is not contemplated by section 9(1). Moreover, the exemption must be with respect to a specified class of goods, and not with respect to a particular brand name, or with reference to goods manufactured by a particular manufacture/dealer. It was permissible to exempt baby foods as such, but it is not permissible to exempt the baby foods manufactured by a particular manufacturer/dealer. It is also contended that the impugned notification issued in favour of only one person is not warranted by clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 9. We are unable to see any substance in the above reasoning. The power of exemption is in the nature of conditional legislation. It is not treated as delegated legislation (vide Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India , and Jalan Trading Company v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha ). It is a power conferred upon the Governments by various taxing enactments to provide for, and meet various types of situations not contemplated by the Act. Under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9, it is open to the State Government to exempt, either partly or wholly, any specified class of goods from sales tax. In such a notification, there shall be no reference to the manufacturer. The notification would be only with reference to the particular class of goods, irrespective of who manufactures them.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & ... on 28 March, 1958
We are also not impressed by the argument that there cannot be a notification falling under both the said clauses. There is no such prohibition. In any event, so far as the notification in question is concerned, it is clearly one falling under clause (ii) of sub-section (1), and not under both the clauses. It should also be remembered that even a single person may constitute a class, having regard to the circumstances in which he is placed (vide Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendolkar ).