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1 - 10 of 13 (0.42 seconds)Section 154 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 147 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Smt. Sneh Lata vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax. on 3 November, 1965
11. Having regard to the above, I find it very easy to conclude that the real nature of the income derived from the property called 'Sri Lakshmi Venkateswara Kalyana Mandapam' is only property income and not business income. When it is property income, the question of application of Section 161(1 A) does not apply. Unless the nature of income derived is business income, Section 161 (1 A) does not come into play at all. I hold from the facts and circumstances of this case that the Income-tax Officer had wrongly included the income derived by the assessee as income from business instead of correctly appreciating its nature and correctly assessing the same as income from property. An income wrongly included by the Assessing Officer under one head can be taken out from that head and included under the correct head in the appeal proceedings and for this proposition, I rely upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Sneh Lata v. CIT [1966] 61 ITR 139 at 143 and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry v. CIT [1958] 34 ITR 342 at 347. In fact I have already seen ground No. 3 raised before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). In that ground the assessee disputed the nature of income derived by the assessee and he raised the plea that the income derived was property income but not business income. However, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) failed to consider that important aspect of the matter in his impugned orders and decided the issue against the assessee. I hold for all the above reasons that I am entitled to consider as an appellate authority what should be the real nature of income and whether it comes under the head 'income from property or income from business'. In this case, I hold that the income should be considered as income from property. For all the above reasons, I hold that the rectificatory orders dated 30-3-1990 passed for each of these four assessment years are illegal. Hence they are cancelled and the original assessments stand.
Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... on 14 March, 1958
11. Having regard to the above, I find it very easy to conclude that the real nature of the income derived from the property called 'Sri Lakshmi Venkateswara Kalyana Mandapam' is only property income and not business income. When it is property income, the question of application of Section 161(1 A) does not apply. Unless the nature of income derived is business income, Section 161 (1 A) does not come into play at all. I hold from the facts and circumstances of this case that the Income-tax Officer had wrongly included the income derived by the assessee as income from business instead of correctly appreciating its nature and correctly assessing the same as income from property. An income wrongly included by the Assessing Officer under one head can be taken out from that head and included under the correct head in the appeal proceedings and for this proposition, I rely upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Sneh Lata v. CIT [1966] 61 ITR 139 at 143 and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry v. CIT [1958] 34 ITR 342 at 347. In fact I have already seen ground No. 3 raised before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). In that ground the assessee disputed the nature of income derived by the assessee and he raised the plea that the income derived was property income but not business income. However, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) failed to consider that important aspect of the matter in his impugned orders and decided the issue against the assessee. I hold for all the above reasons that I am entitled to consider as an appellate authority what should be the real nature of income and whether it comes under the head 'income from property or income from business'. In this case, I hold that the income should be considered as income from property. For all the above reasons, I hold that the rectificatory orders dated 30-3-1990 passed for each of these four assessment years are illegal. Hence they are cancelled and the original assessments stand.
Section 22 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Abdul Qayume vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 22 December, 1989
4. I have heard Shri D.V. Anjaneyulu, learned C.A. for the assessee and Shri C.V. Surya Prakash Rao, the learned Departmental Representative. The learned authorised represen ative for the assessee contended that no doubt, the assessee returned it incomes only under the head 'business income under a mistaken notion'. In fact the income returned would properly come under the head 'property income'. Shri D.V. Anjaneyulu contended that the income-tax return filed for each of these four assessment years contained an admission under a mistaken notion of law. Hence it is an erroneous admission which does not bind the assessee and in support of his proposition that an erroneous admission is not an admission, the assessee relied upon the following decision namely, the Allahabad High Court's decision in Abdul Qayume v. CIT [1990] 184ITR 404 at 411. It is further contended that in view of the administrative instructions in F. No. 81/27/65-IT(B), dated 18-5-1965, a copy of which is now furnished to this Tribunal in a paper compilation, ordains that the officers of the department should not take advantage of the assessee's ignorance as to his rights. It is one of their duties to assist a taxpayer in every reasonable way particularly in the matter of claiming and securing reliefs and in this regard the officers should take the initiative in guiding the taxpayer where proceedings or other particulars before them indicate that some refund or relief is due to him. At some other place in the instructions it is said that whatever the legitimate tax, it must be assessed and must be collected. The purpose of the circular is merely to emphasise that the department should not take advantage of the assessee's ignorance to collect more tax out of him than is legitimately due from him. In view of the above instructions, the Department should not take advantage of the ignorance of law exhibited by the assessee in this case and is not justified to collect tax at maximum marginal rate under Section 161(1A) and in fact the whole income earned by the assessee is in its true nature 'property income'. The assessee relied upon the following decisions:
The Income Tax Act, 1961
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Khalid Mehdi And Ors. on 12 February, 1985
5. Shri C.V. Surya Prakash Rao, the learned Departmental Representative, on the other hand, contended that the income earned by the assessee cannot be 'property income' because the marriage hall was not let out for any long-term specific purpose. Marriage halls cannot be treated as house property. Marriage halls can be treated only as commercial assets. Rest rooms also are part of the same building and the charges collected from the occupiers of those rooms were only business income and not property income and as such the following decisions cited on behalf of the assessee, viz., Khalid Mehdi's case (supra), Phabiomal & Sons' case (supra), K. Rami Reddy & Sons' case (supra).